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Abstract
After the United Nations’ mission in Liberia (UNMIL) ends on September 30, 2015,
effective policing will be a security concern for Liberians. Liberians have expressed fear
that conflict could return if ongoing police training programs do not sustain public safety.
The purpose of this mixed methods study was to understand how UNMIL’s training
affected public confidence in the Liberia National Police (LNP). The theoretical bases for
this study included public choice theory and liberal democratic theory. Quantitative data
were used to address impact of UNMIL’s police training on the maintenance of law and
order. These data were collected through a researcher-developed survey which measured
recruitment, training, effectiveness, and public confidence in the LNP. Participants were
government officials, members of UNMIL, LNP, and civic organizations (n = 120). Data
were analyzed using ANOVA. Qualitative semistructured interview data were also
gathered from 18 additional participants to address the challenges for quality
improvement in the police security forces. The results were inductively coded and
organized across themes and patterns. Quantitative findings indicated a moderately
significant correlation between police perceived knowledge and job effectiveness (r = 0.35). However, qualitative findings show the government of Liberia failed to provide
adequate resource support to complement the training due to its weak commitment.
Diversity of trainers from contrasting policing jurisdictions produced an outcome that
lacked a country-specific context for Liberia. This study promotes positive social change
by informing future police training interventions by the United Nations on a host
county’s policing needs.
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study
Introduction
In the past 2 decades, the United Nations (UN) has increased its involvement in
international security reforms through police training in countries transitioning to
democracies. Zanotti (2004) stated, “Starting in the 1990s, the United Nations has
increasingly been mandated to bring about international security by intervening in failing
states through complex operations which include institutional reform projects” (p. 1). The
UN Security Council has mandated more than 69 peacekeeping missions, including
police assistance operations (Bayley, 2006; Franke & Warnecke, 2009).
International police assistance to nations transitioning from conflict to state
building is not a new phenomenon. To establish order and provide basic services in
occupied Germany and Japan, postwar international police assistance programs were
initiated by the United States following WWII. With the deployment of Ghanaian and
Nigerian police contingents, international police assistance under a UN mandate first
appeared in the Congo in 1960 (Bayley, 2006; Durch, 2010; Furuzawa, 2009). The UN
peacekeeping and police reform interventions also occurred in Cyprus in 1964 and
Namibia in 1989 (Krasno, 2004). The mounting conflicts of the post-Cold War period
and security challenges in re-establishing legitimate national authority in fragile states
impelled the reintroduction of international police assistance as a component of
postconflict peacekeeping. Because of the emphasis on respect for human rights and the
rule of law, contemporary international police assistance and reform requirements are
different from those of the Cold War era. Police reform advocates stress the importance
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of policing practices that adhere to standards of accountability, transparency in
publicizing information on police operational activities, and responsiveness to the
security needs of ordinary citizens (Bayley, 2006; Furuzawa, 2009).
Postconflict peacekeeping and police reform initiatives have not always been
successful (Ellison, 2007). International police reform programs are often hampered by
varying national agendas, limited resources, the lack of strategic guidance, and reluctance
to engage in the local politics of providing postconflict security (Mobekk, 2001).
Goldsmith and Dinnen (2007) argued that some police reform programs fail or become
less effective because the interventions fail to consider local political and social realities
of the reform environment. In addition, the antagonistic relationships between the
military, police, and other security institutions, punctuated by poor justice and
correctional systems, impact peacekeeping and police reform initiatives (Zanotti, 2004).
These issues pose challenges to postconflict international police reform interventions.
Police reform has become recognized as an integral component of peacekeeping
and state building operations (Furuzawa, 2009; O’Neill, 2005). Contemporary
international police reform interventions are led by industrialized donor nations such as
the United States, Canada, Great Britain, and other Western liberal democracies. The
overarching objectives of international police reform interventions are to build stable
democratic regimes in postconflict fragile states and to secure conditions necessary to
support the stability of an emerging new socioeconomic and political world order
(Wiatrowski & Goldstone, 2010).
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For the citizens of Liberia, the fear of conflict recurring after the United Nations
Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) leaves makes the issue of effective policing one of their
most pressing security concerns (Call & Wyeth, 2008; McDonough, 2008; Sawyer,
2005). Liberia needs a well-trained, professional police force dedicated to upholding the
rule of law and one trusted by the population. An effective police force capable of serving
as an instrument for public safety and maintaining law and order is essential to
sustainable statebuilding and democratic governance in Liberia (Alemika, 2009;
Olukoshi, 2008; Sawyer, 2005).
In this study, I focused on the UNMIL’s police reform intervention activities
during the period from 2004 through 2010. It was during this time that the organization
recruited, trained, and deployed officers of the reorganized Liberian National Police
Force. The manner in which the UNMIL’s police training has affected public safety,
maintenance of law and order, and public confidence in the Liberia National Police was
investigated.
Background of the Study
On December 24, 1989, Liberia, the only country in Africa founded by freed
slaves from the United States, plunged into one of Africa’s bloodiest civil wars. Internal
political instability culminated in armed conflict between the government of Liberia and
the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), a rebel opposition faction. In later years,
other rebel opposition groups organized warring factions opposed to the NPFL. These
factions included the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL), United
Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia (ULIMO), Liberia Peace Council,
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(LPC), Liberians United for Reconstruction and Democracy (LURD), and the Movement
for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL; Gadagbui, 2005). The armed conflict lasted 14 years
(1989–2003) and brought death, destruction of life and property, and genocide. It is
estimated that out of the nation’s population of 3.2 million, 250,000 thousand men,
women, and children were killed and 1,000,000 were displaced (Jaye, 2008; Sawyer,
2005). By the time the civil war ended in 2003, the nation had become a failed state
(Kraxberger, 2007).
The Liberian conflict became a concern for countries in the West African
subregion, and later for the international community of nations. In order to bring an end
to the civil war, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the
UN brokered a peace agreement that was signed between the warring factions in Accra,
Ghana in 2003 (Adibe, 1997; Gadagbui, 2005; Saikal, 2000). The Comprehensive Peace
Agreement signed on August 18, 2003 called for its implementation to be led by the UN.
The UNMIL was established on September 19, 2003 by UN Security Council
Resolution 1509. The mission was given the mandate to monitor the ceasefire agreement,
provide national security protection, and implement security sector reforms including
restructuring of the Liberian National Police (LNP) and other security institutions in
Liberia (Jaye, 2008). This included taking charge of organizing and rebuilding Liberia’s
police force and other paramilitary security institutions until Liberian officers are judged
capable of taking over and managing them. The UNMIL was set up and deployed in
Liberia in 2003 (Muller & Sauvant, 2009). The UNMIL’s police training, restructuring
programs, and other security sector reform activities are implemented through the United
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Nations Police (UNPOL), which is also an integral component of the UN Department of
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). The UNPOL’s involvements in peacekeeping
operations vary according to the mandate of the UN Security Council. In the case of
Liberia, the Security Council Resolution also mandated the UNMIL:
To assist the transitional government of Liberia in monitoring and
restructuring the police force of Liberia, consistent with democratic
policing, to develop a civilian police training program, and to otherwise
assist in the training of civilian police, in cooperation with the Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS), international
organizations, and interested States. (Malan, 2008, p. 47)
This provision of the UN Security Council Resolution 1509 provided the legal
basis for the UNPOL’s operations. The UNPOL had authority to maintain law and order,
provide security, and train and restructure the Liberia National Police. According to the
UN Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Document (2006), the
UNPOL was given additional responsibilities under the DPKO’s disarmament,
demobilization and reintegration (DDR) program. These additional responsibilities
included improving public confidence through controlling crime; maintaining law and
order and security; and conducting police reforms through training, restructuring, and
development of the national police. The DDR approach to postconflict policing and
police reform focuses first on ensuring security through the maintenance of law and
order, crime control, and postconflict police restructuring. In Liberia, UNPOL has been
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engaged in all aspects of police work and in the training and restructuring of the Liberia
National Police (Malan, 2008).
Liberia’s constitution affirms a centralized system of governance and public
administration. The security sector legislation that created the police force in 1975
provides for one centralized police force organization for the entire country, the LNP.
The political subdivisions including municipalities do not operate any separate police
systems. Candidates are recruited and trained at the National Police Academy located in
Monrovia, the nation’s capital, before deployment throughout the country (Jaye, 2008). It
was within this legal and political context that UNMIL operated in implementing its
security sector reform programs.
Problem Statement
If the police training and reform programs currently underway do not sustain
public safety and social stability, the country could regress and conflict could return. The
UN Security Council Resolution 2190 (2014) extended the mission of the organization
currently charged with peacekeeping and police reform in Liberia, UNMIL, to September
30, 2015. Policing issues such as inadequate responses, political suppression, corruption,
and abuse of human rights before and during the civil war were central to the dynamics of
the conflict in Liberia, and render a country-specific police reform strategy integral to
sustainable democratic statebuilding (Kromah, 2007; Olukoshi, 2008; Sawyer, 1992).
The process of reform of police structures and administrative arrangements are also
central to ensuring fair, effective democratic policing and sustainable impact on civil
society (Pino & Wiatrowski, 2006). International police reform efforts have not always
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been successful (Ellison, 2007; Goldsmith & Dinnen, 2007; Pino & Wiatrowski, 2006).
Against this backdrop, UNMIL’s police reform interventions in Liberia provide an
opportunity to assess how it has used international police reform standards to recruit,
train, equip, and deploy the LNP force to effectively maintain law and order and gain
public confidence.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study was to gain a deeper understanding of how the
UNMIL’s police training and reform interventions have affected the capacity of the LNP
to effectively maintain law and order and gain public confidence. The findings
contributed to understanding the dynamics that influence training outcomes and inform
stakeholders and decision makers about any possible changes that might be needed to
improve police effectiveness and public confidence. The objective of this study was to
identify the underlying contexts and to contribute knowledge to the establishment of an
effective police force that gains the trust and confidence of the citizens. The knowledge
of the dynamics of a country-specific police reform program is useful for policymakers in
Liberia and for the UN in planning and designing police reform programs for future
postconflict states.
Nature of the Study
In this exploratory case study, I used a mixed methods approach to data collection
and analysis. From the qualitative perspective, I reviewed documents and records and
used open-ended and semistructured interview questions as primary sources of data
collection. I also used the Likert rating scale to collect quantitative data that measured
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numerical indicators of agreement and disagreement. I developed a questionnaire to
evaluate police performance of graduates already working in the field and the public
confidence of civil society. A more detailed discussion of the rationale for the research,
objectives, and methods selected is presented in Chapter 3.
Significance of the Study
The significance of this study is that it filled the gap in the literature on the impact
of the UN’s training of the LNP. No earlier study exists on the impact of the UN’s police
training on the effectiveness of the LNP to maintain law and order and gain public
confidence in postconflict Liberia (Call & Wyeth, 2008; Fallah, 2011; Kromah, 2007;
Olukoshi, 2008). The goal is to contribute knowledge to the establishment of an effective
police force capable of maintaining law and order, and one trusted by the citizenry. In
this study, I examined the effectiveness and results of international police training and
reform interventions in the context of the Liberian situation. Despite various international
police training and reform efforts in postconflict states in Africa, professional policing
and citizens’ trust in the police forces remain elusive (Alemika, 2009; Olukoshi, 2008).
Because international police reform in different postconflict situations reflects varying
country-specific realities and experiences of each society, I sought to understand how
UNMIL’s police training and reform interventions affect the capacity of the LNP force to
effectively and professionally carry out its duties, maintain law and order, and gain public
confidence. I sought to understand the dynamics of UNMIL’s police reform efforts and to
generate knowledge that will contribute to the establishment of an effective police force
that gains the trust and confidence of Liberians. The lessons learned from this Liberian
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case study are important for planning and designing future police reform programs for
postconflict police building. The study, therefore, has important social change
implications such as the protection of human rights, crime reduction, a safer investment
climate for businesses, economic growth, and social stability for Liberian government
policy makers, for other governments in the community of nations, and for the UN in
planning and designing police reform programs for future postconflict states.
Research Questions
The overarching research question that guided this investigation was the
following: How has police training by the United Nations Mission in Liberia affected
police effectiveness and public confidence in the ability of the Liberia National Police to
maintain law and order? This question was expanded by two qualitative questions and
one quantitative question.
Qualitative
Research Question 1: What strategies were used to recruit applicants for police
training?
Research Question 2: What reforms are required to improve the quality of
policing and insure a reliable police security force in Liberia?
Quantitative
Research Question 3: What, if any, difference has the UNMIL’s police training
made relative to the maintenance of law and order, and public confidence in Liberia’s
police force?
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H01: UNMIL’s police training made no difference relative to the maintenance of
law and order, and public confidence in Liberia’s police force.
H11: UNMIL’s police training effected change related to the maintenance of law
and order, and public confidence in Liberia’s police force.
Theoretical Framework
The theoretical frameworks that served as a foundation for this study were social
contract theory, public choice theory, liberal democratic theory, and the theory of
community policing. Social contract theory provides the rationale for the formation of
civil society, considering that humans are by nature self-interested beings and are drawn
by what they desire or perceive to be in their interest (i.e., personal security, protection of
life and property, freedoms, equal distribution of resources) for which they submit to
political authority or governments (Kathrani, 2010). Public choice theorists define police
security as a public good in which benefits are expected by all and provided by the state
to all citizens for their protection and wellbeing irrespective of their contribution (Stiglitz,
2000). Liberal democratic theorists justify the necessity of an effective police force as it
is an embodiment of state authority for protecting the political and socioeconomic
processes (i.e., investments that provide jobs, elections, etc.) that are crucial to
maintaining stability in a democracy (Mulcahy, 1998). Proponents of community policing
theory emphasize the participation of local citizens for effective public safety. Increasing
criminality and rising public protests against police forces around the world, as seen in
the case of ongoing insurgencies in Arab nations and particularly in countries in
transition from conflict to democratization, all signal the need for including community
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policing training and practice in international police reform interventions. The traditional,
reactive way of policing is increasingly ineffective, resulting in low crime-solving rates
and a lack of public confidence in the police (Alemika, 2009; Bayley, 1999). The aim of
the community policing is to approach policing more from a problem-solving perspective
by building partnerships between the police and the population (Bayley, 1999; Pino &
Wiatrowski, 2006).
Assumptions
The study was based on two assumptions. The first assumption was that the
participants who were selected for the study were knowledgeable about the subject
matter. The second assumption was that the participants would be open in their
discussions and that they would answer the interview questions truthfully and to the best
of their knowledge and ability. Factors such as past police culture of withholding
information, pressure from ranking officers, and political influence did not inhibit
objective comments from participants. These assumptions were necessary to the extent
that participants were public officials of the Liberian government and the leaders of
community-based civil society organizations. They represented the population that was
the intended beneficiary of the program. Other key informants were ranking officers of
the LNP force and ranking members of UN mission in Liberia who were the key decision
makers of the police reform program.
Limitations
There were three limitations of this study. The first limitation was that the study
involved a qualitative exploratory component with me as the main instrument for data
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collection, analysis, and interpretation. My bias and subjectivity were recognized in the
process. To minimize this possibility, I remained self-aware and conscious about the
likelihood for bias and exercised neutrality at all times in the process (Creswell, 2007).
The second limitation was that I used purposive sampling. Purposive sampling depends
on the availability of respondents who are knowledgeable about the phenomenon under
study. It should be noted that I worked on location in Liberia, was conversant with the
local target population, and could make informed decisions about recruiting
knowledgeable participants. During the course of the research, I discovered that ranking
officers of the UNMIL, who participated in making key recruitment, training, and reform
decisions, had left Liberia for missions in other countries and could not be contacted.
UNPOL declined to participate in the study. The third limitation was that literature on
postconflict police reform in Liberia is scant and limited in scope (Call & Wyeth, 2008;
Fallah, 2011; Kromah, 2007). Although opinions about the Liberian police were obtained
from government functionaries, civil society, and the citizenry at large, there exists little
independent research data that can validate such opinions. The media have published
various stories, reports, and articles on police reform challenges resulting in alleged
ineffectiveness and a lack of professionalism of the LNP force. The incidents most
frequently cited are rape, sexual violence, drugs, theft, extortion, and involvement in
armed robberies (Nation Times 08/18/09:4; New Democrat 06/12/11:18; Daily Observer
06/20/12:14; National Chronicle 07/11/12:18). The Government’s Poverty Reduction
Strategy (2008) also cited widespread dissatisfaction with, and a lack of citizens’ trust in,
the new police force. Additionally, a recent UN assessment mission’s special report of
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the UN Secretary-General (2012) described the security situation in Liberia as “generally
stable but fragile” and acknowledged the inability of the LNP to maintain law and order
without the support of UNMIL (p. 8

). However, there is limited independent research

done specifically on the results of UNMIL’s police training and its impact on police
effectiveness and public safety in Liberia.
Scope and Delimitations
Participants who were selected for this study resided on location in Monrovia, the
capital city of Liberia. They fell in three categories. In the first category, I used
homogenous purposive sampling of 18 actors and decision makers in the UNMIL’s
reform program. In the second category, I used random sampling of 60 police officers
who were trained and deployed by UNMIL and were active in the field. I also conducted
a random sampling of 60 actors who were male and female leaders and members of
community-based civil society organizations including the Federation of Liberian Youth,
Institute for Research and Democratic Development, Liberia Marketing Association,
New African Research and Development Agency, Action for Genuine Democratic
Alternative, and the National Coalition of Civil Society Organizations of Liberia. These
key informants were individuals who had past and current knowledge of police behavior
and practices in Liberia. This was a representative group of the population that was the
targeted beneficiary of the reform program. I learned about their real life experiences,
including their confidence in the new police force and the overall security reform
program in Liberia.
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Definition of Terms
Conflict: As used in this study, the term refers to armed conflict characterized by
civil war. Conflict results from disagreement over socioeconomic, cultural and political
interests, or concerns that culminate in grievances and violent disagreements from
perceived threats which trigger armed rebellion and war. The conflicts discussed in this
study refer to civil wars between government forces (i.e., army, police and paramilitary
forces) on the one hand and rebel forces on the other. Civil wars in Africa were rooted in
cultural, economic, ethnic, and political factors (Call & Wyeth, 2008; Wezeman, 1999;
Sawyer, 2005).
Democratic policing: As used herein, the concept embodies the idea that policing
is a service with a primary focus more on protecting the human rights and security of the
individual than the state. Democratic policing is the application of the law in a manner
that is professional, impartial, and effective for the protection of all citizens regardless of
their ethnicity, age, gender, political opinion, or religious belief (Bayley, 2001; Celador,
2005; Mulcahy, 1998).
International police: The term was used to refer to an organization of police
officers representing various countries that are brought together to assist in providing law
and order, public security, training, and stabilization in war-torn countries (Hume &
Miklaucic, 2005; Krasno, 2004).
Police: In this study the definition provided by Bayley (1999) was adopted.
Bayley defined police as “people authorized by a group to regulate interpersonal relations
within the group through the application of physical force” (p. 7). The authorization to
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apply physical force to affect behavior, including respecting the rights of others,
preventing human rights abuses, and providing security for all is the distinguishing
characteristic of the police. Bittner (as cited in Bayley, 1999) stated, “The policeman, and
the policeman alone, is equipped, entitled, and required to deal with every exigency in
which force may be used to meet it” (p. 8).
Liberia National Police: In this study, the LNP refers to Liberia’s current police
force trained and deployed by the United Nations Mission in Liberia.
Postconflict: This term is used to describe the period following the cessation of
hostilities. This period is characterized by the signing of a formal peace agreement by
which the warring factions give consent and agree to end the conflict and commit
themselves to the process of national reconstruction. The Geneva Center for Democratic
Control of Armed Forces (2009) described the postconflict environment as characterized
by an unstable security situation which necessitates the provision of security as a priority
for international actors.
Police reform: For the purpose of this study, police reform refers to international
response assistance to a nation’s police building program of which training is an integral
component. A program of postconflict police security reform is a reflection of a
dysfunctional police system and, therefore, the need for change and a clear break with the
past. The Geneva Center for Democratic Control of Armed Forces (2009) summarized
the goals of police reform as prioritizing the equal protection of human rights as primary
objective: producing a humane, accountable, responsive, and capable police force.
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Statebuilding: In this study, the term is used to describe international efforts to
strengthen weak postconflict states by rebuilding public institutions; fostering renewed
sociocultural cohesion within a geopolitical boundary; and establishing a legitimate
internationally recognized functioning central authority having the ability to provide
security, maintain peace, enforce state laws, and maintain a minimum level of economic
development to support democratic transition. The process also involves political
collaborative efforts between local political elites and international actors to ensure that
the outcomes are in accord with the norms of liberal democratic statehood (Dobbins et
al., 2007; Miller, 2010).
Stateness: In this study, the term is used to refer to a situation where, within a
geopolitical boundary, there exists some level of sociocultural cohesion, and a legitimate
functioning central authority has the ability to maintain peace and enforce state laws tp
maintain minimum level of economic development to support democratic transition and
is internationally recognized. The police are an embodiment of state authority and that
stateness is as much a function of state authority as it is a function of effective policing
(Dobbins et al., 2007; Kraxberger, 2007).
The United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL:). The UNMIL was set up and
deployed in Liberia in 2003 under the mandate of UN Security Council Resolution 1509.
The mandate authorized UNMIL to maintain law and order, provide security, train, and
restructure the Liberia National Police (Jaye, 2008; Muller & Sauvant, 2009).
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Summary and Outline of the Study
Liberia was a fragile state in transition from a protracted civil war to peace and
democratization with assistance from the UN and the international community at large. A
critical component of this statebuilding process was security sector reform with a focus
on police building. Liberia needed an effective police force capable of serving as an
instrument for the protection of human rights, public safety, and the maintenance of law
and order.
This study comprises five chapters. In Chapter 1 of the study, I presented an
overview of the research problem, the background of the study, including the increasing
role of the UN in responding to international crises. I discussed the purpose and
significance of the study. I also posed questions about the UNMIL’s police training and
public safety reform interventions that have not been satisfactorily addressed in previous
works. In Chapter 2, I position the study within a broader contemporary scholarly context
on the subject of international postconflict police reform. I review scholarly literature that
is relevant to security sector reform and the UN interventions in postconflict policebuilding. The international state building interventions in the last 2 decades have had
more challenges and setbacks than successes, as security and peace remain elusive. Both
local and international actors are in search of policy options. In this chapter, I provide an
overview of the conceptual basis of international interventions in police reform in post
conflict countries and the accomplishments, challenges, and dilemmas associated with
these reform efforts. The history of the Liberian police force and its operations before and
during the civil war are highlighted; three selected case studies are presented to
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demonstrate their similarity to police reform activities in Liberia. I also discuss the
rationale for police security reform as a prerequisite to sustainable statebuilding and
democratization. I compare and contrast the views of scholars on the outcomes of various
statebuilding initiatives undertaken in the last decade. The theories of social contract,
liberal democracy, public choice and democratic policing, and community policing are
discussed. The perspectives of international public policy practitioners on statebuilding
interventions as a means of persuading weak states to abide by the norms of stateness
were presented.
In Chapter 3, I discuss and examine the theoretical methods of inquiry that
grounds the research. The detailed discussion on the research design used in the study
include the theoretical tradition of inquiry, research sample and population, method of
data collection and procedures, data analysis and issues of quality and ethical
considerations, the researcher’s role, and participants’ protection. The independent
variable in this study was the UNMIL’s reform training strategy. The UNMIL’s training
served as an indicator of whether or not the police was well-trained or poorly trained.
Factors considered included effective policing, issues of ethics, and police behavior. I
used existing research (Kromah, 2007; Ngaima, 2003; Sawyer, 1992) on the behavior of
the Liberian police. Kromah (2007) measured citizens’ perception of the LNP before and
during the civil war and served as a comparative baseline measure. I did multiple year
comparisons of police effectiveness covering four 2-year periods beginning with the time
the UNMIL deployed trained police officers. The other intervening variables that are
discussed revolve around police preparedness and how they affect effectiveness of, and
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public confidence in, the LNP. The dependent variable in this study was the outcome of
the training. This outcome was measured against the UNMIL’s reform mandate and
standards of recruitment, training, and deployment strategies employed considering the
context of the country-specific situation of Liberia. The dependent variables for this study
also included citizens’ confidence. I measured citizens’ confidence in the reformed police
force. Hypotheses were developed to test citizens’ confidence. In Chapter 4, I analyzed
the data and presented the findings of the study. The data analysis include a summary of
the data instruments, a descriptive analysis of the demographic characteristics of
participants, and the results of the statistical analyses of participants’ perceptions, views,
and responses that answered the research questions. In Chapter 5, I presented the
conclusions and recommendations of the study based on my findings and the critical
lessons learned.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
Introduction
In this chapter, I review the literature that is relevant to the study. The goal was to
synthesize the literature on international police reform in the context of international
statebuilding interventions in postconflict states. The chapter is organized into four
sections. In the first section, I discuss the dynamics of postconflict statebuilding,
including the roles, responsibilities, and challenges facing the UN. In the second section,
I define police reform and provide a conceptual basis of police reform for democratic
governance in the context of states undergoing transitions from conflict to
democratization. An historical background of the LNP is presented. The behavior of the
police and citizens’ perception of it as an instrument of repression and terror before and
during the conflict is discussed. In the third section, I review police reform tools and
research works on international police reform interventions with selected cases as
illustrations. In the fourth section, I provide a summary of the chapter highlighting the
theoretical framework and strategies of international statebuilding through police security
reform.
The strategy that I used in searching the literature included using literature
relevant to postconflict international police reform. I used the Walden University library
and other libraries of local universities both in the United States and Liberia. I used
Academic Search Premier and Business Search Premier, ProQuest Dissertations, and
Google Scholar. I explored the websites of the United Nations and the Government of
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Liberia, including websites of government ministries and agencies in Liberia. I used
books and articles published within the last 5 years.
Policing Statebuilding: International Interventions
UN peacekeeping interventions, including police reform assistance operations,
have increased in the post-Cold War period. The UN Security Council has mandated
more than 69 peacekeeping and statebuilding operations since the end of the Cold War to
help strengthen fragile states to transition from conflict to reform and democratization in
countries such as Bosnia, East Timor, Haiti, Kosovo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Solomon
Islands, and Sudan (Durch, 2010; Franke & Warnecke, 2009). There have been more than
100 armed conflicts around the world since 1989. More nations around the world
continue to endure civil unrest characterized by confrontations between police and
citizens and culminating in insurgencies and counterinsurgencies. In 2011 for example,
scenes of demonstrators clashing with police became the defining images of ongoing
insurgencies in Arab nations such as Egypt, Libya, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen (West,
2011). The “Arab Spring” signaled the relevance of international police reform
intervention and how it has become a critical standard for the protection of human rights,
upholding the rule of law, and improving government-citizen relations in the global
context. A well-trained police force can promote postconflict democratization and
societal stability (West, 2011).
The term conflict as used in this study refers to insurgencies and armed conflict
characterized by civil war. Conflict results from disagreement over socioeconomic,
cultural, and political interests or concerns that culminate in grievances and violent
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disagreements from perceived threats, which ultimately trigger armed rebellion and war.
Most of the conflicts discussed herein refer to civil wars between government forces (i.e.,
army, police, and paramilitary forces) on the one hand and rebel forces on the other. Civil
wars in Africa were rooted in cultural, economic, ethnic, and political factors (Call &
Wyeth, 2008; Sawyer, 2005; Wezeman, 1999). In 1995, 14 countries in sub-Saharan
Africa were emerging from complex political emergencies or conflicts and were facing
challenges of postconflict statebuilding and democratization (Green & Ahmed, 1999).
The term statebuilding as used in this study refers to international efforts that enabled
fragile states to build capacity, reconstruct their institutions, and regain stateness and the
authority to govern effectively in the delivery of public goods and services. Miller (2010)
said, “International statebuilding is thus an attempt to spread norms about what states are,
what they should be, and how states govern; it is an attempt by great powers to compel
weak states to abide by norms of statehood” (p. 6). In the process, however, police reform
has become recognized as an integral component of peacekeeping and statebuilding
interventions (Furuzawa, 2009; Olukoshi, 2008).
Contemporary international police reform assistance led by the UN and
industrialized donor nations such as the United States, Canada, Great Britain, and other
Western liberal democracies has occurred largely in postconflict settings. The
overarching objectives of international police reform interventions in postconflict
situations are to build stable democratic regimes in fragile states and to secure conditions
necessary to support the stability of an emerging new socioeconomic and political world
order (Wiatrowski & Goldstone, 2010). The development of strategies by the UN to
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reform postconflict police organizations and enhance their effectiveness often involves
varying perspectives and alternative approaches to police reform. Call (2003) identified
five alternative perspectives that bear on how local policy makers, the UN, and other
donor partners determine priority areas in the police reform process under specific
country conditions: (a) human rights perspective, (b) peacekeeping/military perspective,
(c) law enforcement perspective, (d) economic development perspective, and (e)
democratization perspective. The human rights perspective focuses on police behavior in
the context of upholding international human rights standards and removing violators
from the ranks of the police and the military (Call, 2003). The peacekeeping/military
perspective emphasizes the maintenance of law and order and the prevention of any
possible return to conflict, especially in the periods that immediately follow the cessation
of hostilities and periods of peacebuilding (Call, 2003). The law enforcement perspective
emphasizes local crime control and professional policing with a focus on the protection
of human rights and facilitating the processes of democratization (Call, 2003). The
economic development perspective supports disarmament and demobilization and favors
police reform efforts through broad security sector reforms (Call, 2003). This perspective
also reflects interest in removing impediments to foreign investment and enhancing
peaceful environment for overall economic development. The democratization
perspective emphasizes adherence to the rule of law, justice, and overall security as the
basis for fostering institutional development. This perspective also emphasizes economic
rationale for police reform in the broader context of a linkage between security, economic
development, and democracy (Call, 2003).
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There are many challenges that confront national decision makers, the UN, and
other donor partners in international police reform processes. Pino and Wiatrowski
(2006) argued that most of the international police training strategies offered to
postconflict and developing countries by Western democracies prove less effective
because they do not adequately address issues such as conflict resolution, importance of
citizens’ trust and confidence, corruption, human rights, and citizens’ engagement in
crime control strategies. Call (2003) also described other challenges or tensions. The first
challenge is that police reform often takes place exclusive of other auxiliary institutions.
Call (2003) underscored that if a police reform program is to be successful; it must be
holistic and must consider building the capacities of other relevant institutions in the
justice system that have the potential to strengthen the effectiveness of the police. These
institutions include the courts, prosecutors, and civil society organizations that advocate
accountability of the government. Another challenge is that international police reform is
relatively new and there are fewer credible models of policing (Bayley, 2006). This
creates the need for the reform program to adapt to local realities, such as culture and
political realities. Reformers also tend to draw more on external ideas, replicate their own
models of policing, or insist on applying models that may have worked elsewhere. The
goal must be to ensure local ownership of the reform program. Furuzawa (2009) argued
that international police reform programs must vary from one country to another and be
based on country-specific conditions in order to be successful. Pino and Wiatrowski
(2006) recommended that police training programs must be implemented in ways that
enable individual states “ to be able to create their own versions of policing based on
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standards embedded in democratic principles while tailoring their reforms to their own
socially determined goals and needs” (p. 9). A third challenge identified by Call is the
difficulty in promoting merit-based recruitment in the reform process. While merit-based
criteria serve as the best yardstick for recruitment, the process of recruitment have often
involved pressure from local decision makers to cater to the interests of particular
political or ethnic groups outside of merit. Call argued that police reform programs
should seek to exclude those who have committed human rights abuses or violated
international laws irrespective of such special interests. The challenge here is that the lack
of records resulting from the conflict can result in unintended recruitment of abusers
(Call, 2003).
The overarching goal of international police training to ensure the effectiveness of
postconflict police forces is to help fragile states to regain their stateness (Kraxberger,
2007). Stateness is defined as a situation where there exists within a geopolitical
boundary, some level of sociocultural cohesion and legitimate functioning central
authority having the ability to maintain peace, enforce state laws, maintain minimum
level of economic development to support democratic transition, and is internationally
recognized (Kraxberger, 2007). Stateness is also a function of security and a condition
under the social contract theory. Hansen (2000) stated that “security is the key to a ‘new
social contract’ between the population and its government or society in which the
population is willing to surrender the responsibility for its physical safety into
government hands” (p. 35). Social contract theory provides a rationale for the formation
of civil society. Humans are by nature self-interested beings and are drawn by what they
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desire or perceive to be in their interest (i.e., personal security, protection of life and
property, freedoms, equal distribution of resources) for which they submit to political
authority or governments. It is from this social contract theory perspective that the state
must develop and strengthen its capacity to apply legitimate force to uphold the social
contract and deliver security protection and such other public goods to the citizenry
(Kathrani, 2010; Kraxberger, 2007; Miller, 2010).
The concept of stateness implies that there has existed a situation where a state
has collapsed, and where state structures and legitimate authority for maintaining law and
order have disintegrated. Contemporary literature on stateness also infer various
perspectives of the state, such as weak, strong, failed or failing states depending on the
particular circumstances and conditions of the given geopolitical boundary. Stateness is
as much a function of authority as it is a function of effective policing. Effective policing
is a minimum requirement for making postconflict democratic transition successful and
sustainable (Ellison, 2007; Green & Ahmed, 1999; Olukoshi, 2008). Peace and
socioeconomic and political stability are cardinal to liberal democracy, which also places
a premium on the protection of individual liberties and rights including the rights of
minorities. Liberal democratic theory justifies the necessity of an effective police force as
it is an embodiment of state authority for protecting the political and socioeconomic
processes (i.e., investments that provide jobs, elections, etc.) that are crucial to
maintaining stability in democratic political systems. A police force is a representation of
state authority. The citizens should look up to the state and therefore to the police to
provide security, maintain law and order, ensure free movement of people and goods,

27
also with a sense of security, and to “provide protection for the social and political
processes that are critical to democracy” such as free and fair elections (Mulcahy, 1998,
p. 33). Police and “stateness” for a transitioning liberal democracy such as Liberia, are
also tied together from the perspective of public choice theory.
Public choice theory considers the state or government as an agent and its
institutions and policies as public goods (Stiglitz, 2000; Mulcahy, 1998; Kraxberger,
2007). A police force is, therefore, a public good to the extent that it is an embodiment of
state authority. Public choice theory offers an explanation of police security as a public
good which benefits are expected by all and provided by the state to all citizens for their
protection and wellbeing, irrespective of their individual contribution (Stiglitz, 2000). An
effective police force is one that is effective and efficient in performing its mission of
providing security, safety, and justice to all citizens. Police failure or lack of effectiveness
reflects on the broader issues of national security and political stability. This is why states
transitioning from protracted internal conflicts are haunted by the well-founded fear that
police failure makes the state susceptible to the kind of crises that has the potential to
escalate into a total breakdown of law and order, sociopolitical instability, and a dreaded
return to conflict (Goldsmith & Dinnen, 2007). Sawyer (2007) argued that “The
postconflict state must be a different type of state if it is to meet new challenges. It must
be capable, responsive and participatory” (p. 22).
Community policing theory emphasizes participation from local citizens for
effective public safety. By the 1970s, police administrators, especially in the United
States, recognized that the traditional reactive method of policing had inadvertently
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eroded the citizens’ sense of community and concern for one’s neighbors (Kappler &
Gaines, 2012). Moreover, people were becoming estranged from their police because
they feared the police and criminals alike. They no longer trusted the police enough to get
involved in reporting criminals in their neighborhoods. Community policing therefore
evolved from the theory that a grateful public will gladly provide needed information and
assistance to the police in contrast to one of an adversarial approach. Therefore,
harnessing collaboration from law-abiding citizens in their neighborhoods was also
critical to long-term sustainable change and peace-building (Kappler & Gaines, 2012).
Trojanwicz and Bucqueroux (1998) defined community policing:
Community policing is a philosophy and an organizational strategy that
promotes a new partnership between people and their police. It is based on
the premise that both the police and the community must work together as
equal partners to identify, prioritize and solve contemporary problems
such as crime, drugs, fear of crime, social and physical disorder and
overall neighborhood decay, with the goal of improving the overall quality
of life in the area. (p. 8)
Increasing criminality, and rising public protests against police forces around the
world, as seen in the case of ongoing insurgencies in Arab nations and particularly in
countries in transition from conflict to democratization (West, 2011), all signal the need
for including community policing training and practice in international police reform
interventions. The rationale for this new way of policing is that the traditional, reactive
way of policing is increasingly ineffective, resulting in low crime-solving rates and a lack
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of public confidence in the police. The aim of community policing is to approach
policing more from a problem-solving perspective by building partnerships between the
police and the population (Alemika, 2009; Bayley, 1999; Kappler & Gaines, 2012).
Baker (2006) also argued for example, that the Government of Sierra Leone may have to
harness community policing groups because despite achievements in the country’s police
reform program, delivering effective police services in most parts of the country remains
a significant challenge for the government. In Liberia, the relevance of community
policing to UNMIL’s police reform intervention and to policing practices was
acknowledged in the Government of Liberia’s social and economic development plan
referred to as the Poverty Reduction Strategy (2008):
Given that the history of police-citizen relationships is one characterized
by fear and mistrust, a new emphasis on involving local communities and
adoption of more citizen-friendly policing methods will improve policecitizen relationships. The LNP and other security agencies will formulate
policies to reduce the incidence of corruption, police brutality, and other
ethical violations. (p. 54)
The PRS also recognized the need to train the police to cooperate with local governments
through district-level security committees in order to improve human and economic
security.
Defining and Conceptualizing Police Reform
Police reform as used herein refers to international response assistance to a
nation’s police building program characterized by the construction of an entirely new
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police force from bottom-up under conditions of total collapse resulting from violent
internal conflict (Ellison, 2007; Goldsmith & Sinclair, 2007; Labonte, 2003). Police
reform is also used to describe international efforts to achieve sustainable postconflict
public safety and maintain fairness in the operational behavior of local police through
rebuilding police capacity and restructuring police institutions. The process involves
providing institutional support that focuses on transformational activities including
mentoring, vetting, training and rebuilding services, providing operational security and
support and establishing new structures of public policing to help the local force break
away from its past (Baker, 2006; Bayley, 2001). Contemporary international police
reform requirements are different from those of the Cold War era because of its emphasis
on the respect for human rights and the rule of law. Police reform advocates stress the
importance of policing practices that adhere to standards of accountability, transparency
in publicizing information on police operational activities and responsiveness to the
security needs of ordinary citizens (Ellison, 2007; Furuzawa, 2009). Police reform has
become recognized as a critical and essential prerequisite for successful postconflict
peacebuilding and statebuilding interventions in states that are transitioning from
complex political emergencies or conflicts to regain their stateness (Celador, 2005;
Furuzawa, 2009). The overarching objectives of international police reform interventions
led by industrialized donor nations are to build stable democratic regimes in postconflict
fragile states and to secure conditions necessary to support the stability of an emerging
new socioeconomic and political world order (Marenin, 1998; Wiatrowski & Goldstone,
2010).
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Postconflict international police reform initiatives have not always been
successful (Ellison, 2007). International police reform programs have often been
hampered by varying national agendas, limited resources, the lack of strategic guidance,
and reluctance reform missions to engage in the local politics of providing postconflict
security. These issues often pose enormous challenges to postconflict international police
reform interventions (Ellison, 2007). Durch (2010) noted:
Summarizing the 1990s record in UN “Policekeeping,” one might say that
great ambitions were not matched by great strategies, great competence, or
great success. Mandate drafters seemed to assume that the presence or
moral authority of UN police would be adequate to stabilize post-war
public security or to tame war-tainted police forces; these presumptions
were invalidated nearly every time they were put to the test. (p. 7)
In the case of Haiti for instance, the UN police reform interventions through
training and institutional restructuring of the Haitian National Police (HNP) produced
less successful outcomes for periods that followed the interventions when measured
against crime rates (Ho, 2006). Crimes against the person (i.e., murder and sexual assault
of teen age girls) increased, and some of these crimes were committed by some members
of the police and other security forces (Ho, 2006; Mobekk, 2001). Despite successive UN
missions in the 1990s, reformers in Haiti failed to focus on taking factors such as local
policing traditions, and country-specific sociopolitical realities into account. The
antagonistic relationships between the military, police, and other security factors such as
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poor justice and correctional systems impacted negatively on UN police reform initiatives
(Cockayne, 2009; Zanotti, 2004).
Several researchers have written about postconflict statebuilding and police
reform similar to the UNMIL’s police reform interventions in Liberia. These researchers
include Baker (2008), Bayley (2006), Durch (2010), Ellison (2007), Furuzawa (2009),
Goldsmith and Dinnen (2007), Jones (2008), Kraxberger (2007), Labonte (2003),
McDonough (2008), and Miller (2010). One such study which is relevant to the Liberian
situation was a case study conducted by Glebbeek (2001) on police reform program in
Guatemala. The study examined the strategy applied in the recruitment and training of
aspirants. In that police reform program, members of the old police forces were
deactivated and the old police institution was abolished to establish the new National
Civil Police force. Glebbeek (2001) concluded that the process had not succeeded and
faced significant challenges on account of the recruitment decisions. In contrast, a similar
police reform study done by Stanley (2006) on statebuilding in El Salvador found that the
strategy for building a new police force from the bottom-up was successful because it
provided for continuity and grounded experience in the process by the inclusion of some
members of the old military-controlled police. It also included members of armed
factions, although it was significantly dominated by recruits from the civilian population
who had had no record of involvement in the armed conflict. The two case studies on El
Salvador and Guatemala demonstrate sharp similarities to the security sector reform
program in Liberia.
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Another notable study was done by Goldsmith and Dinnen (2007) focusing on
police building in East Timor and the Solomon Islands. The authors examined police
building in the context of peace building and state building. They focused on two case
studies in arguing that despite its importance to the restoration of law and order, police
building has been a relatively neglected dimension of post-war peace building in
international police security reform programs, and that this neglect is primary the cause
of failures in reforming police institutions especially in postconflict states. Emerging
literature on effective international postconflict police reform emphasizes participation
and ownership of reform programs by local stakeholders. The authors’ conclusions were
critical to understanding the challenges of the UNMIL’s security sector reform initiatives
in Liberia. In his essay on peace and stability in states transitioning from conflict to
democratization, McDonough (2008) argued that despite years of statebuilding
interventions by the international community, postconflict stability remains an elusive
goal for many African nations such as Liberia. This is so because the socioeconomic and
political conditions that culminated in protracted civil wars still prevail to date, and these
conditions are the primary factors that continue to frustrate regional and international
efforts at peace building. Attempts at mitigating these conditions do not by themselves
play any determining role in the success or failure of statebuilding efforts.
McDonough(2008) recommended that sustainable conflict resolution is possible only in
the presence of peace building efforts that deal significantly with those socioeconomic
preconditions that lead to conflict in the first place.
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A program of postconflict police security reform is often a reflection of a
dysfunctional police system which creates the need for change, and a clear break with the
past. Jones (2007) argued that implementing change in police institutions have often been
unsuccessful due to the failure of the administrators or the agents of change to understand
or appreciate the organizational environments in which they operate. Jones (2007)
explained this failure from the perspective of the theory of complex adaptive systems.
Jones (2007) argued that administrative systems that succeed are systems that adapt to
new realities and conditions. Olson (2007) provides an overview of an organization
theory-based approach to the study of public administrative behavior, institutions, and
developments within the context of democratic governance. Administration takes place in
an environment of diversified structures and social relationships. Activities are organized
around well-defined boundaries, rules, and practices. Olson (2007) argued that in the
context of globalization, the ideal public administrator is one who advocates the
emerging view in public policy that supports participatory forms of decision-making. The
points raised by Olson (2007), and Jones (2007) about understanding and managing
change bears strong similarity to this study in the context of interventions by international
actors in police reform programs such as those in the UNMIL. Implementing change with
assumptions that are nested in some international police reform template has the potential
to pose challenges. Atkinson (2008) argued that while liberal intervention in Liberia has
contributed to the process of peace building, the “deficiencies of the intervention” such as
insufficient commitment from the government and the international partners, continue to
pose challenges. Similarly, Sawyer (2005) described the shortcomings in various reform
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activities spearheaded by the United Nations and other international nongovernmental
organizations in Liberia. Sawyer (2005) acknowledged that part of the implementation
challenges are due to problems emanating from resource constraints. However, Sawyer
(2005) emphasized that the greater shortcomings in the implementation of various reform
programs are lack of guidance of a long-term larger vision for a postconflict society, and
the lack of effective coordination amongst implementing agencies and their failure to
engage Liberians as stakeholders in designing and implementing these programs.
The liberal democratic theory on establishing an effective police force is that as
an embodiment of state authority, an effective police force strengthens democracy by
making society safer. A successful police reform program will enhance state authority,
make the society safer, and strengthen democracy in Liberia. Effective policing is a
benefit of liberal democracy because it protects freedoms, rights, and happiness such as
enjoyment of enhanced public safety as a public good (Stiglitz, 2000). Postconflict police
reform is more critical to and definitive of democracy. It is central to democratic selfgovernance defined as the process of governing that involves both government and
citizen stakeholders working together as equal participants in finding solutions to public
problems such as police security reform (Zanotti, 2004). A strategy for postconflict police
reform ought not only to be directed at improving performance effectiveness or
delivering better services, but the strategy should also focus on a process of regaining
legitimacy from the citizenry. This is also why the liberal democratic model of policing
maintains that policing should be practiced in the context of community consent
expressed through respect and public reception and perception of the police both as law
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enforces and protectors of peace. It is from this liberal democratic view of policing that
concepts such as police-community relations and community policing emerged as central
to quality public safety (Mulcahy, 1998).
The Liberia National Police: An Historical Background
Understanding the history of the Liberia National Police (LNP) and its
organizational culture is critical to implementation of a successful police reform program
design. Until it was legally established in 1924, policing functions in Liberia were
performed by the Liberia Frontier Force (LFF). The LFF was a military defense force that
was set up by the government with the mission primarily to patrol and protect Liberia’s
borders. In time, it became an integral part of the central administration of the hinterland
and its functions were expanded to include protection for government officials, forced
recruitment of unpaid laborers for public and private works, and enforcement of tax
collection in the hinterland. The LFF was undisciplined, corrupt, and notorious for its
brutal methods of tax collection (Liebenow, 1969; Sawyer, 1992). In 1924, the
Legislature passed an act establishing the first police force in Liberia. It was a small 15man police force known as the Monrovia City Police with a mission limited to protecting
life and property in Monrovia, the capital city of Liberia. In time, the numerical strength
of the force increased from 400 in 1965 to more than 1000 in 1971. In 1975, rising urban
and rural population, crime, and increasing political and national security concerns
caused the Legislature to amend the original police act and officially establish the
Liberian National Police Force enabling the force to take over national public safety and
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law enforcement duties with police detachments deployed throughout the country (Jaye,
2008; Sawyer, 1992).
The fundamental duty of any police force in a state is to ensure the security of the
citizens and their property. The security of citizens also means protection of human
rights, prevention of crime, and the detection of crime for the purposes of prosecuting
those who violate the social contract (Bayley, 2001; Furuzawa, 2009). In contrast, the
Liberia National Police had a long history of bias, corruption, intimidation, suppression,
and brutality. The LNP behaved in similar manner as did the Liberia Frontier Force
before it. From the outset of its formation, the Liberia National Police Force was largely a
dysfunctional institution that catered more to serving the social, economic, and political
interests of the wealthy and those with political power while it provided little protection
for the majority of the citizens. Prior to the civil war, the LNP was also perceived by the
citizenry to be one of the most corrupt government institutions in the country. The most
notorious bribe takers were the traffic police, investigators, officers on patrols, officers at
traffic check points or road blocks, and officers at report desks (Olukoshi, 2008; Opolot,
2008). The LNP also operated more as agents of state security, insofar as the “state” was
defined as the government in power (Sawyer, 1992; Liebenow, 1987). By 1970, the
security network in Liberia comprised the Liberia National Police (LNP), and a host of
secret police networks including the Special Security Service (SSS), National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI), Executive Action Bureau (EAB) and the National Intelligence and
Security Service (NISS) (Sawyer, 1992). From the 1950s onward, the Liberia police was
the instrument of political oppression executing orders of successive autocratic
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governments and military dictatorships. It carried out countless cases of arbitrary arrests,
detention and torture of students, civil servants, and the murder of members of the
political opposition. By the onset of the civil war in 1989, police brutality had deepened
as some members became part of the government’s secret death squads. Sawyer (1992)
described the use of police force for political repression in Liberia:
By the time of Tubman’s death in 1971, the security network was in
virtual control of Liberia. At least three celebrated treason trials had been
held. In addition, countless instances of arbitrary arrest, detention, and
torture of students, civil servants, and others had taken place under a
veritable reign of terror as suspicion and fear gripped the society. (p. 282)
According to Sawyer (2005), the LNP intimidated and suppressed ordinary citizens and
political opposition leaders to protect the regime during the war. The LNP became
politically biased, militarized, and ethnically divided. Many officers of the LNP
arbitrarily committed human rights abuses and participated in atrocities committed
against unarmed citizens. In its strategy for consolidating peace and security, the
Government of Liberia’s Poverty Reduction Strategy (2008) acknowledged that:
Security in Liberia has been a major concern since independence. Security
forces have been used to intimidate and at times to terrorize the population
and intervene in the political process without respect for the due process of
law. The security forces contributed to a system in which economic
benefits and political power accrued to the elite, leaving the majority of
Liberians in insecurity and poverty. (p. 35)
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Sawyer (2005) argued that past political leaders in Liberia did not value the primary
mission of the police. The mission, to protect the social practices and political processes
that make society safer, included protection of human rights, freedoms, happiness, and
free and fair elections, all of which are critical to strengthening democracy.
Acccording to Kromah (2007) the lack of appreciation of the importance of the
police was reflected in recruitment processes, training, and conditions of work and
promotion practices during the period leading to the civil war. The feeder class of recruits
was from amongst the poverty stricken, demoralized population comprising elementary
and junior high school dropouts mainly from urban neighborhoods. The recruitment
processes and promotion were characterized by a culture of bribery, nepotism. Training
programs placed little emphasis on lessons in policing ethics, accountability, and linking
the protection of life and property to basic human rights and rule of law values (Dunn &
Tarr, 1988; Liebenow, 1987; Kromah, 2007). Officers deployed were poorly paid
compared to other civil servants. They had no benefits, and no housing allowances. They
were underfunded and poorly equipped. They regularly transported themselves in
commercial vehicles to their assignment stations. All of these factors impacted on the
operations of the Liberian police. Throughought the history of the LNP, policing issues
have revolved around the lack of professionalism, low morale, corruption, and extortion
as officers harassed civilians to augment their meager wages (Olukoshi, 2008). These
conditions also left the society under secured and made police service unattractive to
qualified high school and college graduates. Throughout its history, the LNP has been
haunted by a crises of public confidence and distrust. By the time the civil war ended in
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2003, the country’s police system had lost all credibility as a legitimate organization for
public safety and had collapsed. This all accounted for why policing issues were central
to the dynamics of the conflict and why any postconflict security interventions in Liberia
required radical reformation of the police institution, police forces, and their conduct.
In the postconflict context, sustainable statebuilding and socioeconomic
development depend to a large extent on building a police force that can break away from
its discredited past history of corruption, bias, intimidation, and brutality. UNMIL’s
police training process is taking place in a new global environment under countryspecific realities and conditions that inform how training intervention for the LNP must
happen in order to ensure sustainability and ownership.
The Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed on August 18, 2003 in Accra,
Ghana called for security sector reforms to build and maintain effective national security
institutions based on the rule of law, including the restructuring of the LNP. The focus on
police reform was to develop a professional police force that is effective and capable to
protect and serve the citizenry, build safe communities by respecting their human rights,
and responding to crime, corruption, and abuse (Jaye, 2008). Given the tragic history of
the LNP, the issue of how best to restructure the police organization and its operations
and move it away from undue political influence has been a central concern of ordinary
citizens and government leaders in the postconflict democratization process. The
lingering questions are what an effective police force is and what type of police security
force is appropriate to meet the needs of the people of Liberia. How should the LNP be
organized to be effective in providing the police security needs for the people of Liberia?
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The evolving debate appeared to favor the view that police accountability to citizens is
central to public order and to effective policing (Fayemi, 2004; Sawyer, 2005). The
national debate called for a kind of community policing in which local people actively
participate in providing police protection. Sawyer (2005) recommended that the local
people must actively participate as co-producers of their own security protection but in
ways that do not militarize their communities. In 2008, Liberia’s social and economic
development plan referred to as the Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) upheld that:
The LNP will be the primary operational agency responsible for internal
security and will be restructured to ensure greater effectiveness and
efficiency. In particular, the LNP will reassess its recruitment and vetting
practices, before being expanded to address shortages of personnel across
the country. They will be better trained to address personal crime, to
reduce incidents of corruption, and police harassment and to strengthen
the confidence of local communities in the police. (p. 52)
Postconflict Police Reform in Liberia
The United Nations police reform program in Liberia (2003-2011) was
implemented through the United Nations Civilian Police (UNCIVPOL) forces under the
direction of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). UNCIVPOL’s policebuilding and peacekeeping experiences were rooted in UN peacekeeping mandates
implemented in previous postconflict states such as East Timor, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Sierra Leone, and the Solomon Islands (Celador, 2005, Vetschera & Damian, 2006).
Formerly called United Nations Civilian Police (UNCIVPOL), but now called United
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Nations Police (UNPOL) the organization’s mission in Liberia was similar to those of its
previous missions: restore law and order, and provide security and public safety for all
persons regardless of their ethnicity; train, restructure, and strengthen the local police to
ensure its capability to uphold the rule of law and operate effectively in accordance with
international policing standards, and the principles of democratic policing including
respect for human rights (Kumar, 2010; Mobekk, 2001). By the time UNPOL arrived in
late 2003, policing in Liberia had long collapsed and the country was without any
effective rule of law. Police stations had been plundered, destroyed, and abandoned. The
remnants were controlled by rebel factions who also manned roadblocks. In rural Liberia,
informal policing functions were performed by intrusive individuals who called
themselves “police volunteers” but were neither recruited by the interim National
Transitional Government of Liberia, nor approved by their local communities (Jaye,
2008; Friedman, 2011).
UNMIL’s police reform strategy began in 2003 with the establishment of a group
that was responsible to make key police reform decisions. This group comprised ranking
officers of UNPOL and ranking Liberian police leaders of the then interim National
Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL). This group organized the Rule of Law
Implementation Committee which jointly guided the implementation of the police reform
program. Members of the committee were comprised of ranking officers of UNMIL and
ranking police leaders and officials of the government. It included the UNMIL Police
Commissioner, the Minister of Justice, the Minister of National Security, and the interim
Director of Liberia National Police. The first approach was to respond to the urgent need
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to restore law and order. According to the UN Secretary General’s Report to the UN
Security Council (2004), UNPOL and Liberian police leaders established a local police
presence in early 2004. They recruited, vetted, and deployed an initial interim force of
400 former local police officers to work alongside UNPOL in its efforts to drive out
former combatants and reclaim police stations in Monrovia. They also implemented
“quick impact” projects which included the reopening of police sub-stations, taking over
roadblocks, and constructing new mini-stations (Friedman, 2011).
Recruitment and Vetting
According to Friedman (2011) the next strategy of the Rule of Law
Implementation Committee was to decide on the number of police officers to be trained
both in the context of the population of the country and the long term funding capacity of
the government to maintain the new Liberia National Police in the long term. Based on
UN police standards, the Committee recommended that the target size of the new Liberia
National Police would be 3,500 officers by the year 2007. That would amount to a policecitizen ratio of about 1 police officer per 1,000 citizens given an anticipated population of
about 3.6 million when a national population census is conducted in 2008 (UN Security
Council S/2007/479, 2007). The Committee’s first action regarding issues of recruitment,
vetting, and training was to decide on the qualifications and recruitment standards. A
primary consideration was the need to attract qualified applicants from amongst the
population, while avoiding individuals who had been involved in various crimes during
the war. The Accra Peace Agreement had specified that all conflict-era militias including
paramilitary and police-like forces at the country’s international airports and public
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corporation facilities such as the National Port Authority, Liberia Telecommunications
Corporation and the Liberia Petroleum Refining Company, should be dissolved (Jaye,
2008). This challenge was made more difficult when the hundreds of former self-styled
“police volunteers” from around the country flooded to Monrovia and presented
themselves for recruitment. Thousands of former police officers from the pre-war Liberia
National Police force also wanted to maintain their positions as part of the new police
force (Friedman, 2011). According to an International Crisis Group Report (2009), the
Committee decided and formally dissolved the old pre-war police and paramilitary
organizations. All police and paramilitary officers were deactivated along with all selfstyled “police volunteers” who had roamed rural Liberia. The Committee then asked all
interested individuals to apply, be subjected to the entire recruitment and vetting process,
and undergo basic training. Ex-combatants and individuals under the age of 18 or over 55
were ineligible to apply. UNPOL’s restructuring and recruiting section conducted the
vetting. Local Liberian staff did not participate. The recruitment standards included
possession of a high school diploma, good reputation and character in one’s local
community, no war crime history, physical fitness, and successful completion of a written
examination. The names of recruits were published in newspapers for approximately a
week, requesting the public to come forward with information that might disqualify
applicants. The Rule of Law Implementation Committee also sent names of recruits to
leaders and members of community-based civil society organizations and human rights
groups (Friedman, 2011; Malan, 2008).
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The International Crisis Group (2009) reported that the recruitment and vetting
process was controversial and marked by dissenting opinions especially over the decision
to deactivate former police officers. Many local police leaders were concerned that this
decision undermined institutional memory because many senior officers with decades of
valuable policing experience had been relieved of their positions. Citizens and civil
society organizations were concerned that the process made it possible for some
applicants to give false information about their identities or hide information about their
pasts. Liberian police leaders and local nongovernmental organizations such as the
Liberia National Law Enforcement Association held the view that had the Committee
included Liberian officers on the vetting team, this situation may have been avoided
because local officers were better situated to verify the authenticity of applicants’ claims
(Friedman, 2011). According to the report of the International Crisis Group (2009), there
were also internal disagreements within the ranks of the UNMIL brass over the
recruitment and vetting process. As early as 2005, UNMIL’s own human rights
protection unit described the process as a failure, although others vehemently defended
the process (Friedman, 2011).
Training
According to Friedman (2011), training of the first recruits began in 2004 at the
National Police Academy. Initially, trainers at the academy were international police
officers. Later in 2006, efforts were made to build local support by employing local
Liberian trainers although these efforts were hampered by earlier decisions to deactivate
former ranking LNP officers who possessed significant experience to serve as trainers.
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The new LNP officers lacked the practical experience to serve as effective trainers and
largely relied on the assistance of their international counterparts. The trainers used
materials and format that the UNPOL had utilized in other postconflict training situations
in Kosovo and later in East Timor. Initially training was largely fast tracked and lasted
about 3 months. Later, it increased to 6 months for both training at the National Police
Academy and field training. In 2006, some training coordinators determined that the
curriculum compromised quality for quantity and that it favored producing large number
of officers quickly. They argued that the curriculum was more suited for training of
interim police officers than for the development of a sustainable long-term police force
(Friedman, 2011). Moreover, the training materials did not cover subjects such as ethics,
discipline, crime investigation, defensive tactics, and specialized training. The curriculum
was revised in 2006. It included use of manuals on policies and procedures, report
writing, and statement taking. It also covered subjects on police administration, ethics,
discipline, democratic policing, criminal investigation, and community policing concepts
and reflected best practices in other West African countries such as Ghana and Nigeria.
By that time, however, more than 2000 police officers had already been trained and
deployed. They did not benefit from the contents of the new curriculum (UN Security
Council S/2006/958, 2006).
According to the Special Report of the Secretary General on the United Nation’s
Mission in Liberia (2012), UNMIL had vetted, trained, and deployed a new Liberia
National Police force of more than 4,200 officers to date. UNPOL had trained 3,661
regular police, and more than 1,000 officers had received specialized training. UNPOL
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has also set up specialized units within the new LNP organization. The Professional
Services Unit (PSU) comprised 300 officers who received specialized training in crowd
control in Nigeria. The unit serves as first line response to civil unrest such as riots and
mob violence. The Emergency Response Unit (ERU) serves as the only armed counterinsurgency response unit. The ERU will deal with crime situations which may require the
use of firearms in the arrest of armed criminals, hostage situations, and violent crimes in
progress (International Crisis Group Report, 2011). The end of UNMIL’s mission is near
and its scheduled date of departure from Liberia is September 30, 2014. Liberians still
remain genuinely concerned about what needs to be done to ensure police effectiveness
and public confidence in the ability of the Liberia National Police to maintain law and
order after UNMIL’s departure.
Objectives of International Police Reform
This subsection describes the objectives of international police reform in
postconflict states. The international community is increasingly involved in implementing
police reform programs, especially in nations destabilized by political confusion and
lawlessness, or weakened by civil wars. A review of the literature on the specific
objectives of police reform and the strategies required to achieve them is critical to
understanding how a successful reform program can contribute to an overall national
reform agenda, particularly from the perspective of strengthening the process of
democratization. Police reform in a postconflict situation is unlike reforms within police
organizations in countries with stable, functioning governments such as in the United
States and much of Europe. Police reform in a postconflict situation is haunted by a pre-
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conflict experience under which instead of upholding the law, the police force is highly
politicized and discredited because it was controlled by an unpopular regime that used the
force as an instrument of political repression (Downes & Keane, 2006; Mulcahy, 2008).
Alemika (2009) argued that in most African countries, pre-conflict police practice is
characterized by regime protection and reactive policing. Police forces lack independence
and policing is characterized by protection of the regime in power. The protection of
rulers often culminates in violations of the rights of citizens thereby leading to open
conflict.
According to Alemika (2009) reactive policing is the form of policing by which
laws are enforced after they are violated. Reactive policing is in contrast to proactive
policing whereby laws are enforced before they are violated. Proactive policing involves
law enforcement by the prevention of general public insecurity and crime through
surveillance, intelligence gathering, and promotion of cordial relations with local
communities (Alemika, 2009). The reactive enforcement is manifested through
investigations, apprehension, detention, and prosecution of those suspected of the crime.
Here, the problem is that policing relies on victims to report crime, but victims are
reluctant to do so because they perceive the police as ineffective. The experience of past
police aggression and brutality under unpopular regimes raises the bar in determining the
objectives and requirements of a sustainable police reform program in a postconflict
situation. Understanding the key factors that lead to open conflict in a postconflict state
can link to how a police reform program should be structured to enable a reformed police
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force to become more responsive and effective in policing when those factors recur
(Alemika, 2009).
The goal of a transitional, postconflict police reform program must be structured
so as to enable the new reform police force to break away from the illegitimate
institutional practices of its discredited past. A reformed police force must be one that
embraces democratic policing principles and values and plays its critical role as an
integral component of democratization. This is defined as the process by which the rules
and procedures for citizen participation in governance are applied to institutions that were
previously governed by coercive control (Mulcahy, 1998). An effective democratic police
force is critical to the character of the postconflict security provided. This makes police
reform an integral part of the democratization process in a postconflict state. Here, the
emphasis is on how to create an effective democratic police force that adheres to the
requirements of the rule of law and respect for human rights. The goal is also to support
expansion of democratization and ensure a safe environment that is conducive for
investment and the development of market economies (Bayley, 2001; Alemika, 2009;
Celador, 2005). Bayley (2001) described the following as characteristics of an effective
police force that supports a sustainable program of democratization:
•

A democratic police force caters to the needs of individual citizens; it is
impartial in its exercise of police authority and serves the needs of the
citizens. Such a police force is not one that is controlled by the government
and does not cater to the orders of public officials. In other words, the citizens
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should expect that their police force will respond effectively to their
individual and community needs;
•

A democratic police force is one that serves the interest of individual citizens
and their communities and demonstrates daily, that it is there to serve their
interest; that its policing powers and protective capacity will be utilized to
protect the citizens;

•

A democratic police force is accountable to the law and not to the
government; here, police actions are guided by the rule of law. In other words,
the policing authority should not be controlled or directed by the arbitrary
actions of those in the government. This will avoid the likelihood of abuse of
power and abuse of the rights of the citizens; and

•

A democratic police force is one that protects human rights. The protection of
human rights also means that policing operations must at all times be impartial
at all times. It must provide protection for individuals, groups and all of the
processes and activities that are essential for the exercise of individual rights
in a democracy. These activities include the exercise of rights such as freedom
of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of movement and freedom to
associate with others. The police must also protect the citizens from attempts
by government functionaries to execute arbitrary arrest, and illegal detention.
The police must also remain impartial in the administration of justice; and its
operations must encourage citizens to pressure government for their rights. (p.
51)
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The democratic policing characteristics outlined above are also expounded by the
Geneva Center for Democratic Control of the Armed Forces (DCAF). According to the
DCAF (2006), emphasis on the goals and objectives of police reform have shifted from
prioritizing technical training and skills such as in investigation and evidence gathering in
the 1990s, to include a focus on upholding human security, basic human rights, equal
protection of all citizens without discrimination against illegal acts under the law,
exercising restraint in the use of force except to achieve a necessary result, equal
treatment and equal access to justice, equal protection of potentially vulnerable groups
such as children, the elderly, women, refugees, displaced persons and members of
minority groups; and community policing. Community policing is the strategy by which
the goals of policing are redirected towards service to communities and responsiveness to
their needs. Community policing ensures effective police–community engagement
through consultations and feedback and the integration of the concerns of the citizens and
their communities into policing policies, management, and delivery of security services.
This shift in emphasis is the result of increasing international involvement in
peacekeeping operations and postconflict democratic governance reforms. The DCAF
also emphasizes the development of a police force that is transparent and accountable in
its operations. A police reform program must also emphasize the principles of ensuring
equal treatment and access to security and justice, inclusiveness or an ethnically
integrated new police force, professionalism in the exercise of police powers, effective
chain of command structure, and availability of requisite resources such as equipment. A
successful police reform program should take place in an environment where there is a
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strong judicial framework and a civil society that can exercise independent oversight. The
reform should be one that fosters cooperation between the reformed police and other
security institutions and actors that are both local and international. DCAF links effective
democratic policing to poverty reduction, sustainable social and political stability, and
economic development.
International Police Reform: Selected Cases
Since the 1990s, the international community has devoted substantial efforts to
police and security sector reforms in many postconflict nations. The postconflict police
building program is conventionally regarded as a key process of transition to
democratization particularly from the perspective of the protection of human rights
(Bayley, 2001; Pino & Wiatrowski, 2006). This section briefly describes reform
strategies of three police reform programs in Bosnia/Herzegovina, East Timor, and the
Solomon Islands. The cases were selected because they bear similarity to ongoing police
reform program in Liberia.
The public safety and security mandates of the United Nations mission in each of
the three postconflict states cited above were twofold: (a) restore law and order and
provide security for all, and (b) restructure the local police force to ensure that they can
effectively operate in accordance with international policing standards, principles of
democratic policing and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms (Day, 2000;
Celador, 2005, Vetschera & Damian, 2006; Dinnen et al., 2006). The restructuring
strategies and certification processes employed by each of these missions were also
similar. They included recruitment of candidates, vetting, screening, and investigation for
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previous human rights abuses. Training was provided to all officers (Hood, 2006; LemayHebert, 2009; Dinnen et al., 2006). At the time that each of these missions ended, they
had achieved their mandate of restoring law and order. In East Timor for example, the
mission achieved a number of other successes including the monitoring of parliamentary
and presidential elections in 2007 (Hood, 2006). However, all of the missions failed in
their mandate to establish effective functioning local police force in each of the three
postconflict states (Celador, 2005; Dinnen et al., 2006). In the cases of East Timor and
Bosnia/Herzegovina, the failure to establish effective police force led to extended periods
of operation with redefined mandates (Day, 2000; Hood, 2006; Celador, 2005). The
various reasons cited for the failure included political interference in the process, ethnic
rivalries, ill-conceived police reform mandates, and failure to design country specific
restructuring strategies (Furuzawa, 2009; Lemay-Hebert, 2009; Strachan, 2009).
Lessons Learned
The lessons learned from the case studies above attest that police reform is a
critical component of any successful postconflict statebuilding program. In the three
cases discussed above, police reform was not successful despite successes in restoration
and maintenance of law and order (Dinnen et al., 2006). What all three cases also have in
common with the Liberia National Police is that in all situations, the police were part of
the problem. They were corrupt, ethnically divided, militarized, and politically
manipulated. They abused the human rights of those they were trained to protect, lost
public confidence, and were ineffective at providing security for all citizens (Celador,
2005; Lemay-Hebert, 2009; Sawyer, 1992). The other lesson learned is that donor-driven
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reform program designs tended to be over-prescriptive, and non-consultative. The
programs were not locally owned or planned in the context of local realities. This was the
rationale for unsuccessful outcomes such as in the case of reforms in the Solomon Islands
with a history of ethnic rivalries. The police restructuring programs were more complex
and difficult to achieve. This led to the periodic replacement or extension of mandates of
the reform missions. In Liberia, for example, UNMIL’s mission was extended in 2008,
2012, 2013, and again in 2014 all on account of security sector reform concerns.
Odugbemi and Jacobson (2008) argue that governance reform interventions in political
societies must ensure country ownership. No reform program can succeed without
participation of all stakeholders including the citizens who are ultimately the intended
beneficiaries. To the extent that the local context of policing varies from one country to
another, the design and implementation of any international police reform assistance
program must be based on context-specific knowledge and expertise in order to be
successful. Many of the problems experienced in the missions in the three case studies
raise questions about UNMIL’s approaches to police security reform in Liberia (Celador,
2005; Dinnen et al., 2006; Strachan, 2009; Lemay-Hebert, 2009).
Literature Analysis and Conclusion
Many authors provide a comprehensive overview of the issues regarding
international postconflict police reform assistance led by the UN and industrialized donor
nations such as the United States, Canada, Great Britain, and other Western liberal
democracies. The overarching objectives are to help fragile states regain stateness, foster
stable democratic regimes, and secure conditions necessary to support the stability of an
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emerging new socioeconomic and political world order (Kraxberger, 2007; Wiatrowski &
Goldstone, 2010). Mounting conflicts of the post-Cold War period and security
challenges in reestablishing legitimate national authority in fragile states signal the
increasing relevance of international police training interventions as a critical standard for
the protection of human rights, upholding the rule of law, and improving governmentcitizen relations in the global context (Ellison, 2007; Furuzawa, 2009; West, 2011).
International police reform initiatives have not always proved successful owing to
factors such as absence of country-specific reform strategies and local commitment to
ownership. Call (2003) identified alternative perspectives that focus on police behavior in
the context of upholding international human rights standards and removing violators
from the ranks of the police force, maintenance of law and order, and the prevention of a
possible return to conflict as well as facilitating the processes of democratization. Many
challenges also confront national decision makers, the UN, and other donor partners in
international police reform processes. Pino and Wiatrowski (2006) argued that most
international police training strategies offered to postconflict nations by western
democracies prove less effective because they do not adequately address issues such as
conflict resolution, importance of citizens’ trust and confidence, corruption, human
rights, and citizens’ engagement in crime control strategies. Call (2003) underscored that
if a police reform program is to be successful, it must be holistic and must consider
building the capacities of other relevant institutions in the justice system (i.e., courts,
prosecutors, civil society etc.) that have the potential to strengthen the effectiveness of
the police. Another challenge is that international police reform is relatively new and

56
there are fewer credible models of policing. This creates the need for the reform program
to adapt to local realities. In contrast, reformers tend to draw more on external ideas,
replicate their own models of policing or insist on applying models that may have worked
elsewhere. Furuzawa (2009) argued that international police training and reform
strategies must vary from one country to another and be based on country-specific
conditions in order to be successful.
There is a well-founded fear amongst Liberians that conflict can return in the
future if the UNMIL’s police training and reform programs do not yield effective results.
What is absent from the literature is an analysis of the effectiveness, results, and future
implications of the police training and overall reform program by the UN Mission in
Liberia. UNMIL’s police training interventions provide an opportunity to assess how the
UN has responded to the global challenges of postconflict police reform in the process of
recruiting, training, and building a new Liberian National Police Force that can break
away from its discredited past, effectively maintain law and order, and gain public
confidence as a professional force.
Chapter Summary
In Chapter 2, I examine the contemporary scholarly literature on international
postconflict police reform. I provide the conceptual basis of international interventions in
postconflict police reform. The overarching objectives are to help fragile states regain
stateness, foster stable democratic regimes, and secure conditions necessary to support
the stability of an emerging new socioeconomic and political world order (Kraxberger,
2007; Wiatrowski & Goldstone, 2010). According to Kathrani, (2010), stateness is a
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function of security and a condition under the social contract theory. The state must
strengthen its capacity to apply legitimate force to uphold the social contract and deliver
security protection as a public good for which the citizens surrender responsibility for
personal security and protection of life and property to government. Liberal democratic
theory justifies the necessity of an effective police force as an embodiment of state
authority for protecting the political and socioeconomic processes (Miller, 2010). Public
choice theory offers an explanation of police security as a public good which benefits are
expected by all and provided by the state to all citizens for their protection and wellbeing
(Stiglitz, 2000; Kraxberger, 2007). Community policing theory emphasizes participation
from local citizens for effective public safety (Kappler & Gaines, 2012).
Many authors provide a comprehensive overview of the issues. Effective policing
is a minimum requirement for making postconflict democratic transition successful and
sustainable. International police reform initiatives have not always proved successful
owing to factors such as absence of country-specific reform strategies and local
commitment to ownership (Pino & Wiatrowski, 2006). Call (2003) underscored that if a
police reform program is to be successful, it must consider building the capacities of
other relevant institutions in the justice system (i.e., courts, prosecutors, civil society etc.)
that have the potential to strengthen the effectiveness of the police. Another challenge is
that international police reform is relatively new and there are fewer credible models of
policing (Bayley, 2006). This creates the need for the reform program to adapt to local
realities. In contrast, reformers tend to draw more on external ideas, replicate their own
models of policing or insist on applying models that may have worked elsewhere.
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Furuzawa (2009) argued that international police training and reform strategies must vary
from one country to another and be based on country-specific conditions. Lessons learned
from the case studies are that police reform programs must be context-specific, and be
grounded in local participation.
What is absent from the literature is an analysis of the effectiveness, results, and
future implications of the police training and overall reform program by the UN mission
in Liberia. UNMIL’s police training provides an opportunity to assess how the UN has
responded to the challenges of postconflict police reform in the process of recruiting,
training, and building a new Liberian National Police Force that can break away from its
discredited past, effectively maintain law and order, and gain public confidence. Chapter
3 describes the method of inquiry that grounds the study.
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Chapter 3: Research Method
Introduction
In this chapter, I discuss the research design applied in the study. I provide a
rationale for selecting the most suitable theoretical method of inquiry that grounds the
study. I also describe the theoretical tradition of inquiry, research setting, sample and
population, and process of data collection. I discuss issues of ethical considerations. I
describe the role of the investigator and the steps taken to contact and protect participants
in this study. The purpose of this study was to provide a deeper understanding of how the
UNMIL’s police training and reform interventions have affected the capacity of the LNP
to effectively maintain law and order and gain public confidence. The overarching
research question was the following: How has police training by the United Nations
Mission in Liberia affected police effectiveness and public confidence in the ability of the
Liberia National Police to maintain law and order? The mixed-method model of inquiry,
which combines both qualitative and quantitative methodologies, was used as the most
suitable method of inquiry for the study (Creswell, 2007; Rudestam & Newton, 2007;
Trochim & Donnelly, 2008). The independent variable in this study was the training by
the UN mission in Liberia. The dependent variable was the impact of the training on the
effectiveness of LNP to maintain law and order and gain public confidence.
Research Design and Approach
The LNP was chosen as a case study in order to carry out an in-depth study and to
be able to assess the effects of the UNMIL’s police reforms on the organization. The
defining characteristic of a case study approach is its focus on one instance of the
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phenomenon that is to be investigated. There may be insights to be gained from looking
at one case, which can have wider implications that may not be realized by trying to
cover a wider scope. The goal is to illuminate the general by looking at the particular
(Denscombe, 2005). In this exploratory case study, I combined both qualitative and
quantitative methodologies. According to Creswell (2012), the planned mixing of the
methods is a procedure for collecting, integrating, and analyzing both quantitative and
qualitative data in a single study to understand a research problem. Rudestam and
Newman (2007) also described the mixed model as
A pragmatic approach in which questions of method are secondary to the adoption
of an overriding paradigm or worldview guiding the investigation. Thus, it might
be possible to mix research hypotheses of a confirmatory nature with general
questions of an exploratory nature, structured interviews and scales that are
quantitative with open-ended interviews and observations that are qualitative, and
methods of analysis that draw on both traditions to expand the meaningfulness of
the findings. (p. 51)
The mixed model brings balance to data analysis and affirms interpretation.
According to Creswell (2007), qualitative research is a process of inquiry through which
the researcher builds a complex, holistic picture, analyzes words, and reports detailed
information. The qualitative exploratory case study method of inquiry often is
recommended for studies where the research requires exploration and there is a need to
present a detailed account of the topic. The researcher needs to learn about the topic in
order to provide a narration and the viewpoint of participants (Creswell, 2007; Rudestam
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& Newton, 2007). The method focuses on the study of real life situations, places,
organizations, events, and concepts. It is preferred because of the type of data that are
required and the purpose of the study, which is how the UNMIL’s police training and
reform interventions have affected the maintenance of law and order and public
confidence in the LNP. In this study, the qualitative method of inquiry was employed
because international police reform under postconflict conditions is an emerging
phenomenon. This methodology enabled the discovery of how the UNMIL administered
its police reform program and what happened in the process. The objective was to
determine whether any change might be needed to develop a police force that is effective
for maintaining law and order and is legitimate in the eyes of Liberians.
Quantitative research is based on the idea that information about a social
phenomenon can be quantified or measured. It can be expressed numerically and
analyzed by statistical methods (Creswell, 2012). From the quantitative perspective, I
developed a competency skills level questionnaire and used the Likert rating scale to
collect quantitative data that measured numerical indicators of agreement and
disagreement levels. I also developed a questionnaire to evaluate police performance and
the public confidence of graduates already working in the field. I reviewed documents
and records and used open-ended and semistructured interview questions. The primary
sources of data consisted of the following: (a) documentary sources such as reports, mass
media, and archival sources; (b) individual semistructured interviews with open-ended
questions; and (c) a survey questionnaire. The methods of analysis under the mixedmodel strengthened the meaningfulness of the research findings (Rudestam & Newton,
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2007). There was difficulty in identifying comparative baseline measures because prewar
factual data do not exist because police records and documents were destroyed during the
civil war (Jaye, 2008; Kromah, 2007; Malan, 2008). However, I used existing research
(Kromah, 2007; Ngaima, 2003) on the behavior of the Liberian police which measured
citizens’ perception of the LNP before and during the civil war. I also did multiple year
comparisons of police effectiveness covering four 2-year periods beginning with the time
UNMIL deployed trained police officers. Other intervening variables that were
considered included police preparedness and response to crime, riots, and natural or
human made disasters and how they impact the effectiveness of, and public confidence
in, the LNP.
Setting and Sample
In qualitative research, sampling is the process of selecting a subgroup of the
population. The sample is the representative group of potential participants who are
relevant given their understanding of the phenomenon under study (McNabb, 2008). In
this section, I describe the population, sampling procedures, sample size, and the
approaches that I used in selecting and accessing potential participants for the study. The
research was done in Liberia. The target research population consisted of participants
who have resided in Liberia before and after the signing of the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement between the warring factions in Accra, Ghana in 2003.
Sampling Procedure
In this section, I describe the procedures used to contact participants. According
to Rudestam and Newton (2007), providing a detailed description of steps taken to gain
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access to participants is crucial in the research process. Walden University’s Institutional
Review Board (IRB) approved both my dissertation proposal and my IRB application
under approval #07-30-13-0065268 and authorized the use of the research instruments to
conduct the research. Following the IRB approval, I submitted separate recruitment
letters to my community partners for the survey and the interview. The recruitment letters
provided information and criteria for participation in the study and how interested
individuals could contact me to express their interest. The recruitment letters were
displayed on the information boards of my community partners. My community partners
also authorized me to use their public premises to conduct the research. For this study,
my community partners were the UNMIL, LNP, the Ministry of Justice, University of
Liberia, Federation of Liberian Youth, Institute for Research and Development, and the
National Civil Society Council of Liberia.
Potential participants first contacted me by phone to express their interest. I
arranged meetings with interested participants who met the qualifications for
participation at scheduled dates and times during which I gave them the consent forms.
Initial contacts began with informal conversations about the research being undertaken
and how important the result of the research might be for participants and for Liberia as a
whole. I developed rapport and built participants’ trust by explaining the purpose and
importance of the study, particularly why participants were targeted to participate in the
study. I attempted to persuade participants that their knowledge about UNMIL’s police
training program and their opinions about its outcome were important to the building of
an effective police force in Liberia. I explained the consent forms and informed
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participants that they could decide to participate or not to participate in the study and that
their participation must be based on their voluntary informed consent. Participants were
given the assurances that they were free to cancel their participation at any time.
Participants were also assured of complete confidentiality and total anonymity throughout
the study and long thereafter (Creswell, 2007; Rudestam & Newton, 2007). I conducted
the research from December 2013 through August 2014.
Sample Size
The sampling practice most frequently applied in sampling procedures is to
randomly select a sample size that is representative of the population, study it, and then
generalize the findings from the sample to the whole population (Creswell, 2007;
Onwuegbuzie & Leech, 2007). According to the report of the population and housing
census conducted by the Government of Liberia (2008), the population of Liberia was 3.4
million. There were also 1,566 registered community-based civil society organizations in
Liberia (Civil Society Organizations Directory for Liberia, 2012). I drew a sample size
from these community-based civil society organizations because they are a representative
group of the population that is the beneficiary of UNMIL’s police training program. I
drew a sample size from among the police officers who had been trained and deployed.
According to the Report of the UN Secretary-General (2012), UNMIL had trained and
deployed 4,200 police officers since the inception of its police training program in 2004. I
also took a sample size from decision makers in government and in UNMIL.
For this study, the selection criterion was experience as the unit of analysis. Here,
experience meant experience as an actor having either participated in the process of
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administering UNMIL’s police training, or as an officer trained and deployed by UNMIL.
It also meant experience as a decision maker or an observer and a targeted beneficiary
from civil society of the outcome or impact of UNMIL’s police reform program. Random
sampling and purposive sampling were utilized for the three categories of population
based on experience as the criteria for selecting potential participants who are key
informants. Key informants were participants who were knowledgeable about the
phenomenon to be studied and who had the ability to provide information useful in
drawing meaningful conclusions (McNabb, 2008; Rudestam & Newton, 2007). I
proposed a sample size of 70 participants comprising 10 to 15 decision makers, 20 to 30
police officers, and 15 to 25 members of civil society organizations to guide the research.
However, after recruitment letters were posted, many police field officers and civil
society members called and expressed interest to participate in the study. According to
the literature, key informants should be recruited until the aim of the research is
accomplished (Creswell, 2012; McNabb, 2008; Rudestam & Newton, 2007).
I increased the sample size to 136 participants because of the diversity of data
sources (Creswell, 2007). For the interview protocol, I used homogenous purposive
sampling of 16 actors and decision makers. Key informants in this category included
leaders of community-based civil society organizations, ranking officers of UNMIL’s
Civil Affairs Division, the LNP, and former ranking officials of the Liberian Government
as policy level decision makers who participated in, and were knowledgeable about the
police training process. Their experiences as actors in the police training program
purposefully informed the research problem. UNMIL’s police division, UNPOL, initially

66
consented to participate in the study but later declined. For the survey questionnaire, I
used random sampling of 60 police officers and supervisors who were trained and
deployed by UNMIL and were actively in the field. I also did random sampling of 60
members and leaders of major community-based civil society organizations. Their
experiences as civil society beneficiaries of UNMIL’s police training program
purposefully informed the research problem. Sampling is the purposeful selection of
potential respondents that are relevant for the study (Creswell, 2012; Singleton, 2005).
Participants who responded to the survey questionnaire were leaders and members of
community-based civil society organizations and police field officers and supervisors.
Participants who responded to the interview questions were leaders of community-based
civil society organizations, ranking officers of the LNP, officials of the Civil Affairs
Division of the United Nations Mission in Liberia, and officials of the Liberian
government. The community-based civil society organizations included the Federation of
Liberian Youth, Liberia Marketing Association, Center for Transparency and
Accountability in Liberia, New African Research and Development Agency, Action for
Genuine Democratic Alternatives and the National Coalition of Civil Society
Organizations of Liberia. These organizations were a representative group of the
population that was the anticipated beneficiary of the police training and reform program.
I learned from their real life experiences and their perceptions about the new police force
and about the overall police security reform program in Liberia. Table 1 below shows the
category of participants in the sample size.
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Table 1
Category of Participants
Population

Liberia National Police:
Police Ranking officers
Police Field Supervisors
Police Rank-and-File

Sample Size
Interview
Survey
Total
Questions
Questionnaire participants
4
1

10
50

4
11
50

UN Mission in Liberia: UNMIL
Civil Affairs Officials

4

4

Government of Liberia:
Ranking Officials of Government

3

3

Civil Society Organizations:
Leaders - Civil Society
Members – Civil Society

6
60

6
60

Total number of participants

18

120

138
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Data Collection
I collected data for this research on location in Liberia. This was because UNMIL
was still actively involved in police reform efforts in the country, and also because all of
the other actors and prospective participants were in Liberia. A limitation in the
collection and analysis of the data was the difficulty in identifying comparative baseline
measures because pre-war factual data did not exist as police records and documents
were destroyed during the civil war. However, I used existing research (Kromah, 2007;
Ngaima, 2003; Sawyer, 1992) on the behavior of the Liberian police. Research conducted
by Kromah (2007) measured citizens’ perception of the LNP before and during the civil
war and served as a comparative baseline measure. I also did multiple year comparisons
of police effectiveness covering four 2-year periods beginning with the time UNMIL
deployed trained police officers. Other intervening variables considered included police
preparedness and response to riots and natural or manmade disasters and how they affect
the effectiveness of, and public confidence in, the LNP.
Pilot Test
Following the IRB’s final approval, I conducted a pilot test. According to
Rudestam and Newton (2007), a pilot test is appropriate because it can help strengthen
the validity and reliability of the instruments. The pilot test was administered in
Monrovia, Liberia with a sample size of 15 respondents who did not form part of the
main study target group members. They possessed the characteristics similar to the main
target audience. A response pattern to ensure an understanding of the questions was also
studied. As a result of the pilot test, I determined that a modification of the instruments
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was needed. The one rationale was that one set of questions sought information that only
police officers could provide, while the other rationale was that some of the survey items
were written in ways that were not clear and did not solicit the appropriate responses. I
filed a Request for Change in Procedure Form with the IRB to revise the language in
some of the items and to prepare separate survey questionnaires for the Liberia National
Police. The IRB granted my request and the revisions were made. The revisions did not
change the original content of the questionnaire. The data collection instruments I used in
this study consisted of a set of 13 individual interview questions, a separate survey
questionnaire which comprised 31 items for community-based civil society respondents,
and a survey questionnaire which comprised 40 items for officers of the LNP. Other data
sources utilized were public documents and observational field notes.
The four sets of data analyzed were the folllowing: (1) survey questionnaire; (2)
interview questions, (3) documents, and (4) field notes. I dsigned a survey questionnaire
to collect quantitative data using a Likert rating scale (Passmore et al., 2002; Trochim &
Donnelly, 2008). The questionnaire consisted of two types with one specifically for
participants from the LNP and the other for members of community-based civil society
organizations. This rationale was that some of the survey items were specific only to
police participants who participated in the UNMIL police training and were deployed in
field as officers. I used the interview questions to collect qualitative data (Creswell,
2012). Participants in the interview protocol were ranking officers of the LNP, officials
of the UNMIL, officials of the government of Liberia, and leaders of community-based
civil society organizations. The documentary sources included public documents or
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archival sources, institutional reports, and reports from mass media including local and
international newspapers on the Liberian National Police (McNabb, 2008; Rudestam &
Newton, 2007). I also used existing research (Kromah, 2007; Ngaima, 2003; Sawyer,
1992) on the condition and behavior of the Liberian police. Research conducted by
Kromah (2007) measured citizens’ perception of the LNP before and during the civil war
and served as a comparative baseline measure. I maintained meticulous records of
observational field notes and used good quality recording tapes which aided in the
transcription and analysis of the data (Creswell, 2007; Rudestam & Newton, 2007).
The data for this study was collected from multiple sources, namely interviews,
survey questionnaires, documents, and field notes. I utilize three sources of data for the
qualitative component of the research. These sources were interviews, documentary
sources, and the field notes. For the quantitative component, I applied survey
questionnaires utilizing the Likert rating scale to collect quantitative data that measured
numerical indicators of agreement and disagreement levels.
Qualitative Data
Interviews
The survey interview is one of the main sources of data collection in a qualitative
study. In this study, the interviews consisted of prepared, semistructured questions that
focused on the purpose of the research. I used the individual, in-depth interview
technique because it was intensive and flexible, and it allowed me to solicit detailed
information about the phenomenon being studied (Creswell, 2007; Trochim & Donnelly,
2008). I prepared open-ended questions for all categories of participants. The interview
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technique was individual one-on-one interviews. I conducted face-to-face, individual, indepth interviews with informants to solicit key information and to explore the subject
matter of the interviews in detail (Rudestam & Newton, 2007). I took care not to engage
participants with a fixed agenda during the interviews and ensured that the questions
were answered in appropriate sequence. I also probed for details and sought clarifications
to avoid ambiguities ((McNabb, 2008). There was one case in which 3 key informants
who were ranking officers in the LNP preferred not to be recorded. The informants
signed the consent form and responded to the interview questions in writing.
Documents
According to Singleton and Straits (2005), documentary sources include public
documents, reports, mass media, and archival sources. In this study, I used available
documentary sources which included public documents from UNMIL, LNP, and the
Ministry of Justice reports and literature reviews. Other documentary sources that I used
included the Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed in Accra, Ghana in 2003 between
Liberia’s warring factions, relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions and
mandates, and reports from local and international newspapers on the LNP.
Field Notes
The final source of qualitative data for the study was my recorded field notes.
According to Creswell (2007), the researcher’s observational field notes are a credible
source of valid data. I maintained meticulous records of observations in the field and kept
a journal of the notes that I took on a daily basis during the interviews and throughout the
study. These notes formed part of the data analysis and the findings of the research.
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Quantitative Data
Survey Questionnaire
In order to focus on the research objective, I prepared and used semi-structured
and open-ended survey questionnaires using Likert scales for two separate sets of
participants (Creswell, 2007; Rudestam & Newton, 2007). I used the Likert rating scale
to collect quantitative data that measured numerical indicators of agreement and
disagreement levels. On the scale items, I asked respondents to rate each item on a 5 item
response scale of disagreement and agreement levels where 1=strongly agree; 2=agree;
3=disagree, 4=strongly disagree; and 5=neutral (Passmore et al., 2002; Trochim &
Donnelly, 2008). I also developed the questionnaire to evaluate police performance and
public confidence of graduates already working in the field. In Chapter 4, I analyzed the
data, conducted comparisons, and validated the findings through triangulation (Creswell,
2012).
Issues of Ethics and Quality
My primary responsibility as a researcher was to behave in an ethical manner and
uphold ethical standards throughout the study. The ethical issues involved in data
collection include requirements for ensuring informed voluntary consent, protecting
confidentiality of participants, and being careful in clearly communicating information
about any benefits of the research to participants. Additionally, I concerned myself with
the possible risks of their involvement as participants and the need to communicate with
participants before and after the research. The main ethical issues were the need for
informed consent of participants and the need to ensure that participants did not
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experience harm or were not placed at some disadvantage as a result of their participation
(Creswell, 2007; Rudestam & Newton, 2007). Ethical concerns of quality also revolved
around the need to establish the credibility of the research. The requirement for
credibility was to ensure validity and reliability. Reliability is the extent to which
research is dependable or has the potential to produce the same results when replicated
under similar circumstances. Strategies to improve reliability include maintaining
meticulous records of fieldwork, using good quality recording tapes, and documenting
the process of analysis. I applied these strategies during the course of data collection.
These strategies aided in transcribing and analyzing the data and establishing the stability
of responses from the participants (Creswell, 2007; McReynolds et al., 2001). Validity is
the extent to which the research findings are accurate and well-founded and are in
consonance with participants’ perspectives and beliefs. Acceptable measures of validity
recommended by the authors include prolonged engagement with participants to build
trust, persistent observation and learning, checking for misinformation, using field notes,
memos, and multiple researchers, using multiple sources of data, peer review, clarifying
researcher’s bias, member checking, providing rich thick description, and external audits
(Creswell, 2007; McReynolds et al., 2001; Rudestam & Newton, 2007).
In this study, I attempted to deepen my knowledge and understanding by building
trust through personally visiting participants and spending extensive time with them in
the field. I used a tape recorder to record interviews, probe and check for misinformation.
I maintained thorough records of field work, and documented the process of analysis. I
took care to delineate what was salient and relevant to the purpose, interest, and focus of
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the study. The findings were peer reviewed by professionals in the field. Additionally, the
preliminary findings were also shared with selected participants for their feedback to
ensure that they conform to the participants’ experiences, perceptions and beliefs. These
measures enhanced accuracy and the quality standard of the study (McReynolds et al.,
2001; Rudestam & Newton, 2007; Trochim & Donnelly, 2008).
Researcher’s Role
I personally conducted the research and managed the processes involved at all
stages from data collection, data analysis, and report writing. I recruited potential
participants for the interviews through use of cell phones and visits to participants’
offices or locations. I served as the primary instrument for data collection. During the
interviews, I used good quality voice recorders and took written notes, all of which I used
in transcribing and analyzing the data. I collected all relevant documents. I utilized my
technical training and skills in conducting interviews which were achieved while working
as a hiring services analyst with the City of Philadelphia. I also utilized my longstanding
public service experience as an economist, lawyer, and public administrator, as well as
my knowledge as a newspaper columnist and author on socioeconomic and political
governance issues on Liberia.
Avoiding Researcher’s Bias
I avoided bias in the research because doing so was critical to credibility and
trustworthiness. I remained conscious of my role as the researcher and the main
instrument of data collection to avoid bias in the data collection process. According to
McNabb (2008), there is likelihood that a researcher being the main source of data
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collection can be tainted by bias given his proximity with the data and its sources. I
maintained a high degree of consciousness about the possibility of bias and I was
objective in the process at all times. In order to enhance credibility and trustworthiness, I
took care not to engage participants with a fixed agenda during the interviews.
Participants’ Protection
Protecting participants by maintaining confidentiality and anonymity was critical
to the success of this study. Participants were recruited on the basis of their voluntary
informed consent. I explained the purpose of the study and how the information they
gave would be used in the research. I explained the consent form and informed
participants that they could decide to participate or not to participate in the study,
reminding them that their participation was based on their voluntary informed consent.
Before starting the interviews and survey questionnaires, I gave participants the
assurance that they were free to cancel their participation at any time that they wished to
do so. I assured participants of complete confidentiality and total anonymity throughout
the study. I demonstrated respect for the privacy of the participants by asking them to
decide where they should be interviewed. After the interview data was collected, the
identity of participants was sealed by use of codes in the data analysis presentation
(McNabb, 2008; Rudestam & Newton, 2007). A detailed description of actual ranks and
positions of the key informants, especially for the qualitative interview data, cannot be
cited because doing so may reveal their identification. Participants in qualitative
interviews consisted of ranking officers of UNMIL Civil Affairs Division, leaders of key
civil society organizations, heads and former heads of the Liberia National Police
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directorate, police field supervisors, career trial lawyers, former solicitors-general, a
former Judge of the Civil Law Court, and ranking government officials, including a
former minister of justice and a former minister of labor. I coded the names of participant
interviewees in letters and numbers to maintain confidentiality. I coded the UNMIL
respondents as UN with the first respondent on the list as UN1, followed by UN2 and so
on. I coded leaders of civil society organizations as CSO1, followed by CSO2 and so on.
I coded ranking police officers as PO1, PO2, PO3, et cetera. I coded ranking officials and
former officials of government including judges, lawyers, solicitors-general, and
ministers as G1, G2, G3 and so on. All respondents demonstrated interest in the research
and considered it necessary and timely considering the looming UNMIL drawdown.

Chapter Summary
In Chapter 3, I described the theoretical method of inquiry and design that
grounds the study. I used the mixed-method model combining both qualitative and
quantitative methodologies as the most suitable theoretical method of inquiry. From the
quantitative perspective, I developed a survey questionnaire and used the Likert rating
scale to collect quantitative data. From the qualitative perspective, I used open-ended and
semistructured interview questions. I also reviewed documents and records. The primary
sources of data consisted of documentary sources such as reports, mass media, and
archival sources, as well as individual semistructured interviews with open-ended
questions for stakeholders. The methods of analysis under the mixed-model approach
strengthened the meaningfulness of the research findings. The number of participants for
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both the interview and survey questionnaire was 138. Participants were purposefully
selected utilizing experience criterion as unit of analysis. I coded and analyzed the data
through detailed description, direct interpretation, and the establishment of patterns. I
examined the impact of UNMIL’s police training on the effectiveness of, and public
confidence in, the ability of the Liberia National Police to maintain law and order. I
validated the research findings by using multiple sources of data, rich thick description,
member checking and peer review. The methodology yielded information that
contributed to my understanding of the context of international postconflict police reform
as a critical tool for postconflict state building. In Chapter 4, I analyze the data and
present the findings in response to the research questions.
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Chapter 4: Results, Data Analysis, and Findings
Introduction
In this chapter, I analyze the data and present the findings of the study.
Participants in the sample were asked to indicate their views on how the UNMIL’s police
training and reform interventions have affected the capacity of the LNP to effectively
maintain law and order and gain public confidence. The data analysis was divided into
three sections. In the first section, I summarize the data instruments used in the study.
The second section provides a descriptive analysis of the demographic characteristics of
participants. In the third section, I present the results of the statistical analyses of
participants’ perceptions, views, and responses that answered the research questions.
Summary of Data Instruments
The survey and interview items were used to measure competencies that were
arranged in three defined categories and subcategories: (a) recruitment strategy, (b)
training, and (c) effectiveness on job performance. Recruitment strategy was used to
measure procedures applied by UNMIL in the recruitment and vetting of applicants for
the new LNP. Training was used to measure the nature and content of knowledge and
skills imparted, inclusive of country-specific policing guidelines, and citizens’ perception
of training acquired based on demonstrated police performance. According to McLellan
(1998), the benefits derived from police training are not easily measured and are often
realized in the long term. However, they can be reasonably assessed by the targeted
beneficiaries. In the case of Liberia, the targeted beneficiaries of the UNMIL police
reform are the citizens who also comprised members of civil society organizations. They
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were in the position to make a before-and-after comparison and gauge the relation
between police training acquired and their effectiveness on job performance.
The effectiveness on job performance was used to measure the ability of the
police to apply knowledge and skills acquired to effectively conduct policing operations
and maintain law and order. Subcomponents of effectiveness on job performance were
the following: (a) public confidence, and (b) police conduct. Public confidence was used
to measure the extent of citizens’ self-assurance in the ability of the police to provide fair,
impartial, and equal treatment to all citizens in the exercise of police authority and to
respond effectively and timely to crime. Police conduct was used to measure behaviors
and practices of police officers which impact on police integrity. Table 2 below shows
how each category was defined and the competency that was measured. Table 2 also
shows the items assigned from both survey and interview instruments. In the case of the
interview protocol, several probing questions were posed to respondents in addition to the
items cited in each category.
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Table 2
Competency Category
Competency Category

5. Recruitment Strategy:
Measured procedures established and
thoroughness applied in the
recruitment and vetting processes to
ensure that only applicants who had
not committed human rights abuses
and who had demonstrated good
behavior in the local communities
were recruited.
II. Training:
Measured nature and content of
knowledge and skills imparted
inclusive of local content and
international policing principles; and
citizens’ perception of training
acquired based on demonstrated
performance by police.
III. Effectiveness on Job
Performance:
Measured the capacity of the police
trained to respond effectively in
conducting policing operations; to
maintain law and order and gain the
confidence and trust of the citizenry.
Effectiveness Subcategory:
3a. Public Confidence
Measured citizens’ self-assurance in
the ability of the police to respond
effectively and timely to crime; and
public perception of fair and
impartial treatment in the exercise of
police authority.
3b. Police Conduct
Measured behaviors and practices of
officers that impact on police
integrity and public confidence.

Survey & Interview Items
Survey
Interview
Items:
Items:
Civil Society
LNP: Police
Interview
Participants:
Participants Participants:
Item #s:
Item #s:
Item #s:
5, 6, 7

8, 9

8, 9,10, 11,
12, 13, 14

15, 16, 17,
18, 19, 20,
21, 22, 23, 24

1, 10, 12, 13

5, 6, 8

8, 9, 10, 11, 12,
13, 14, 15, 16,
17, 18, 19, 20,
21, 22, 23, 24,
25, 26, 27, 28,
29, 30

25, 26, 27,
28, 29, 30,
31, 32, 33,
34, 35, 36,
37, 38, 39, 40

9, 10, 11, 12, 13,
14, 15, 16, 17,
19, 21, 25, 34

25, 26, 27,
28, 29, 30,
32, 33, 34, 40

3, 7, 10, 11,
12, 13

6, 17, 22, 23, 24,
26, 27, 28, 29

32, 33, 35,
36, 37, 38, 39

4, 9, 10, 12, 13

2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 9,
10, 11, 13
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Demographic Characteristics
In this section, I describe the demographic characteristics of police officers and
civil society actors who responded to the survey questionnaire. I present the data in two
parts. The first part is about the demographic characteristics of civil society actors. The
second part is about the demographic characteristics of police officers.
Demographic Characteristics of Civil Society Participants
The data shows that 33 (55%) of the civil society participants were females and
27 (45%) were males (Table 4). A majority of the civil society participants were between
35 and 59 years of age, indicating that they were middle-aged people (constituting 52%).
This was followed by youthful citizens between 18 and 35 years, constituting 43.3%
(Table 3). The percentage of the civil society participants aged 60 years and above was
small (5.0%). The ratio of those participants were married or single (Table 5). A majority
of the civil society participants were college students representing 43.3% followed by
college graduate and those attending graduate school, representing 37% (Table 6). The
participants concurred with the police officers that background checks were important in
recruiting police officers. The participants also concurred that the background checks by
UNMIL were not thorough (Table 16).
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Table 3
Age of Civil Society Participants
Age
Between 18-35 Years
Between 35-59 Years
60 Years and Older
Total

Frequency
26
31
3
60

Percent
43.3
51.7
5.0
100.0

Table 4
Gender of Civil Society Participants
Gender
Male
Female
Total

Frequency
27
33
60

Percent
45.0
55.0
100.0

Frequency
25
27
4
2
58
2
60

Percent
41.7
45.0
6.7
3.3
96.7
3.3
100.0

Table 5
Marital Status of Civil Society Participants
Marital Status
Single
Married
Divorced
Widow
Total
Missing 99.00
Total

83
Table 6
Educational Level of Civil Society Participants

Did not go to school
Junior high school
High school
College
Graduate/Post graduate school
Total

Frequency
2
5
5
26
22
60

Percent
3.3
8.3
8.3
43.3
36.7
100.0

Demographic Characteristics of Police Officers
The data shows that 23 (38%) of the police participants were females, and 37
(61%) were males (Table 8). A majority of the police participants were between 18 and
35 years of age, indicating that they were youthful law enforcement officers. Thirty-seven
(62%) were married, and 22 (37%) were single (Table 9). A majority of the police
participants were high school graduates, indicating that they met the recruitment criteria
regarding educational level (constituting 63%). Approximately one-tenth of the police
participants were college students (Table 10). Regarding the police training program, all
of the police participants (100%) indicated that they graduated from the police training
academy (Table 11). A majority graduated in 2007 (28.3%) followed by 2005 (18.3%).
The third group graduated in 2006 and 2009 with the same number of graduates,
constituting 13.3% (see Table 12). Most of the police described their professional area of
concentration as criminal investigation representing 35% followed by multiple areas of
assignment representing other as 32% (see Table 13). Traffic control constituted 15%.
The police described education as important for recruitment with the mean (M = 2.95
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with SD = 0.22); followed by background checks (M = 2.88) and by physical ability as
well as honesty (M = 2.82 and M = 2.81 respectively).
Table 7
Age of the Police Participants
Age

Frequency

Percent

Between 18-35 Years
Between 35-59 Years
60 Years and Older
Total

31
28
1
60

51.7
46.7
1.7
100.0

Frequency
37
23

Percent
61.7
38.3

60

100.0

Frequency
22
37
1

Percent
36.7
61.7
1.7

60

100.0

Table 8
Gender of the Police Participants
Gender
VMale
aFemale
l
iTotal
d

Table 9
Marital Status of Police Participants
Marital Status
VSingle
aMarried
lDivorced
i

Total

d

85
Table 10
Police Training: Education of the Police Participants
Educational Level
Junior high school
High school
College
Graduate/graduate school
Total

Frequency
1
38
18
3
60

Percent
1.7
63.3
30.0
5.0
100.0

Table 11
Police Training: Did you graduate from the Police Academy?
Did you graduate from the police training academy?

Frequency

Percent

60

100.0

V
a
lYes
i
d
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Table 12
Police Training: In what year did you graduate from the Police Academy?

2000
2002
2005
2006
2007
V
2009
a
2010
l
2011
i
2012
d
2013
2014
1995
1979
Total

Frequency
1
1
11
8
17
8
4
2
4
1
1
1
1
60

Valid Percent
1.7
1.7
18.3
13.3
28.3
13.3
6.7
3.3
6.7
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7
100.0

Table 13
Police Training: Please indicate your professional area of concentration

Valid

Missing
Total

Criminal investigation
Traffic Control
General Civil Protection
Other
Total
99.00

Frequency
21
9
9
19
58
2
60

Percent
35.0
15.0
15.0
31.7
96.7
3.3
100.0
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Results of Data Analysis
In this study, I used the survey and interview instruments to determine
participants’ perception of the ways in which, if any, the UNMIL training made a
difference in police effectiveness and public confidence in the context of recruitment
strategies, training, and effectiveness on job performance. I used the data instruments also
to determine whether there were challenges that required reform. In this section, I
present the results of the statistical analyses of participants’ perceptions, views, and
responses that answered the research questions. I present the results and analyses by
category and subcategories of the variables being measured in the context of answering
the research questions.
Research Question 1
What strategies were used to recruit applicants for police training?
I sought to assess the strategy or procedure applied by UNMIL in recruitment and
vetting of applicants for the new LNP. This included any possible participation of the
local population in the recruitment process to ensure that only applicants with good
character, who had not committed human rights abuses and who had demonstrated good
behavior in the local communities, were recruited. The UN international police reform
mandates for postconflict states require that restructuring strategies include a thorough
process of recruitment, vetting, and investigation of candidates for previous human rights
abuses (Day, 2000; Celador, 2005; Vetschera & Damian, 2006).
I analyzed the responses from the survey questionnaire, interview transcripts,
documents, and field notes. Police respondents agreed that conducting background
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checks was important for recruitment of applicants to serve in the new LNP (Table 15:
M=4.77); and civil society respondents also agreed with the police assessment (Table 16:
M=4.77). However, while police and civil society respondents all agreed that that
conducting background checks was important for recruitment, they concurred that
background checks conducted by UNMIL were not thorough and that the vetting process
did not prevent applicants who had committed human rights abuses from being recruited
into the police force (Tables 15: M=2.75; and 16: M=2.18). Interview respondents also
agreed with this view. Responses from participants in the interview indicated that the
UNMIL’s recruitment and vetting processes from the onset were less organized and less
thorough, and that this situation caused criminals and former combatants to be recruited
especially in the years between 2004 and 2007.
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Table 14
Police Perception of UNMIL Recruitment Criteria (n = 60)
UNMIL Recruitment Criteria

Low

High

Mean*

SD

Education

2.00

3.00

2.95

0.22

Tribe

1.00

3.00

1.07

0.32

Physical Ability

2.00

3.00

2.82

0.39

Honesty

1.00

3.00

2.81

0.44

Background Check

1.00

3.00

2.88

0.37

Trauma Healing/Counseling

1.00

3.00

1.21

0.59

Membership in old LNP

1.00

3.00

1.15

0.52

Not being a former combatant

1.00

3.00

1.89

0.82

5.

Mean values: 1= Not Important, 2= Important, 3= Very Important
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Table 15
Police Perception of Background Checks conducted by UNMIL (n = 60)
Low

High

Mean*

Std.
Deviation

5.00

4.77

0.77

5.00

2.75

1.65

5.00

1.98

1.41

5.00

2.75

1.49

5.00

2.18

1.23

5.00

4.00

1.24

Survey Items
Backgrounds checks are important
for the recruitment of applicants to 1.00
serve in the Liberia National Police.
Background checks conducted by
UNMIL were thorough and
1.00
prevented former combatants from
being admitted for training.
Applicants recruited for training
were given trauma counseling
1.00
before starting training.
Liberian Government officials
were involved in the recruitment
1.00
and selection of applicants for
police training.
Liberian Government officials
exercised oversight to ensure that
1.00
police training content was countryspecific.
During the recruitment if a
citizen knew an applicant who had
committed human rights abuses he 1.00
or she would not complain to
UNMIL for fear of revenge.

5.

Mean values: 1= Strongly Disagree, 2= Disagree, 3= Neither Disagree Nor Agree, 4=
Agree, 5= Strongly Agree
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According to interview respondents, the UNMIL’s recruitment process from the
onset began by UNMIL officers calling interested persons through loudspeakers to come
and join. The UNMIL police recruiting officers mounted on vehicles with loudspeakers
went into the communities around Monrovia and started randomly calling on interested
persons to come and join the police. According to CSO5, during the civil war, more than
60% of Liberian youth took up arms. The war lasted 14 years and most of these youths
grew up knowing only about the use of arms. By the time the UNMIL recruitment
started, most of these people were the ones who first rushed to get recruited. They felt
that being in the police was the way they could protect themselves in the communities
because they knew that residents in these communities knew about their involvement in
atrocities against them during the war.
On the question of whether UNMIL applied due diligence to ensure that former
combatants were not recruited, UN1 argued that:
“It was not written in black and white, but former combatants certainly were
exempted from the process. But again given the number of combatants in the
country nobody can say they know all their former ex-combatants but then that’s
why the thing was open also to the public because the public would be able to
identify ex-combatants who had some kind of human rights issues.”
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Table 16
Civil Society Perception of Background Checks conducted by UNMIL (n=60)
Low

High

Mean*

Std.
Deviation

5.00

4.77

0.621

5.00

2.18

1.19

5.00

3.90

1.13

Survey Items
Background checks are important for
recruitment of applicants to serve in the
1.00
Liberia National Police.
The behavior of the Liberia National
Police show that background checks
conducted by UNMIL prevented former
1.00
combatants from being admitted for
training.
During recruitment if a citizen knew an
applicant who had committed human rights
1.00
abuses he or she would not complain to
UNMIL for fear of revenge.

5.

Mean values: 1= Strongly Disagree, 2= Disagree, 3= Neither Disagree Nor Agree, 4=
Agree, 5= Strongly Agree

However, the theme which emerged was that the recruitment process was arbitrary and
compromised due diligence in favor of recruitment of large numbers of candidates. G3, a
former solicitor-general in the Ministry of Justice observed that:
“UNMIL recruitment process, I believe was wrong. They came and just took the
microphone, the loud speakers went around in the communities in their pickups
and saying “who all want to join the police come!” without giving the Liberian
people the opportunity to say look this man participated in the war; or he did this,
he did this. So they recruited people on their own and their vetting standards were
different; their vetting requirements were different from if Government had to do
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it itself. You see, so they came and said well we just have to take anybody we can.
And as a result, the police force does have an integrity problem where people who
participated in crimes around the country are in the security services, and it is
known.”
Interview participants G2, PO1, PO2, PO3, CSO1, CSO4 and CSO5 all concurred
with this view. They argued that in the years especially between 2004 and 2007,
candidates who were recruited were not investigated with due diligence regarding their
previous human rights records to ensure that only applicants who did not commit human
rights abuses were enlisted. CSO5 maintained that “We saw at the beginning of the whole
recruitment and training of new police that there was not sufficient due diligence done in
terms of going and engaging communities.” Citizens in the local communities were not
consulted regarding prior behaviors and character of candidates. G1 also concurred with
this view:
“At the time I served as Minister of Justice, I felt that there were some lapses in
the process in that many of the recruits that UNMIL hired were people who were
perpetrators of heinous crimes during the civil crisis. We even argued that we
don’t have any issue that these people should come and may be rehabilitated. But
you need to have people with more experience; some old hands in the business to
be here to serve as mentors of these people. But UNMIL refused. They recruited
people entirely new; many of them young people who had been involved into all
kinds of things. UNMIL did not listen to what we were telling them. So you know
many times you see today police officers are being disrobed because of this crime
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and that crime and turned over for prosecution. It doesn’t tell very well for a force
that was trained by people such as the United Nations.”
Participants argued that UNMIL should have done more radio communication in the
country’s local vernaculars to inform residents in the local communities that police
applicants should be people who have good character and good human rights
backgrounds.
Similar themes emerged over the vetting process. Police and civil society
participants in the survey strongly agreed that conducting background checks were
important for the recruitment of police applicants. However, they acknowledged that the
recruitment and vetting processes conducted by UNMIL were not thorough and did not
prevent some applicants who had poor human rights records from being recruited.
Interview participants UN1 and UN2 argued that the vetting process was open to the
public throughout the country. According to UN1, pictures of candidates were posted at
various locations including marketplaces throughout the country because the public
would be able to identify ex-combatants and other applicants who had some kind of
human rights issues and then pass the information to UNMIL. UN3 explained:
”We used that method because we felt that the citizens were trusting UN as
impartial body to convey their messages without any fear. Whenever a name or
information was given to us about applicants, we confidentially provided them to
the recruiting officers and there were no cases of retaliation.”
In contrast, the themes that surfaced most was that during the vetting process, citizens
feared retribution and avoided reporting combatants of former warring factions and
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known criminals from their neighborhoods to UNMIL, especially in first four years of the
recruitment. Because security was fragile at that time, UNMIL did not provide immediate
protection for people in the local communities. For fear of retribution, citizens in the local
communities avoided giving information to UNMIL on any candidates especially, those
who were ex-combatants, former soldiers of the old disbanded army, police, and known
criminals from the neighborhoods. G1, G2, G3, PO1, and PO3 all concurred with this
view. According to PO3, there was fear of the unknown and the people did not feel safe
or free to give information to UNMIL. PO1 argued that:
“They would not report to UNMIL as to the person’s past abuses and criminal
record. Primarily because they didn’t feel that the system in itself actually was
strong enough to provide them the kind of protection that they needed if they
provided such information.”
G2 also explained that:
“People were afraid that there could be reprisals because especially from the
beginning when they were recruiting at the time that right after the war police was
not present everywhere and even UNMIL was not present everywhere and they
were putting pictures of these people on bulletin and asking people to come and
report. People were afraid to report. And number two, the publicity was poor.”
The lesson here was that as the result of these lapses in the recruitment and vetting
processes, former combatants known to have committed human rights abuses, and
individuals who exhibited bad behavior in the neighborhoods were recruited into the new
police force. CSO2 and CSO5 concurred with this view, and cited examples:
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CSO5:
“I used to live on the Old Road during the period of the crisis. One of the fighters who
really terrorized us in the community became a big person in the police. Yes, when I
moved to where I am now, I saw him again in that neighborhood. I got terrified because
he knew how he terrified us.”
CSO2:
“There is a young lady who is now in the police. When she lived before in our
community, she went and took feces and put it in the community’s well, you know out of
anger. They had to close the well because of that. That woman got recruited in the
police.”
Apart from feelings of insecurity and fear of retribution, other social and
economic factors such as high unemployment also impacted negatively on the vetting
process. UN4 acknowledged that there were “isolated cases” in which people would
avoid reporting individuals who had demonstrated bad behaviors in the communities:
“I wouldn’t say people would fear retribution. I would say most people would
consider that if I did this, I would be harming somebody who wants to earn a
living. So this is more on the social consideration rather than on understanding
human rights and the need to pay for human rights abuses.”
G1 and CSO5 argued in contrast that such cases would not apply to known criminals and
former combatants. By the time UNMIL determined in 2006 that its recruitment and
vetting processes had been compromised and needed to be revised, more than 2000 police
officers had been recruited, trained and deployed (Freidman, 2011).
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Research Question 2
What, if any, difference has the UNMIL’s police training made relative to the
maintenance of law and order, and public confidence in Liberia’s police force?
Through this question, I sought to assess police training and effectiveness on job
performance. Training measured the nature of knowledge and skills imparted inclusive of
local content or country-specific policing guidelines and methods applied. The Geneva
Center for Democratic Control of the Armed Forces (2006) emphasized that the new
focus of international police reform interventions in addition to technical training and
skills such as criminal investigation and evidence gathering in the 1990s, included
upholding human security, basic human rights, equal protection of all citizens without
discrimination, exercising restraint in the use of force, equal access to justice, and equal
protection of potentially vulnerable groups. The citizens’ perception of training acquired
was also assessed based on demonstrated performance by police trained and deployed.
The effectiveness on job performance measured the ability of the police to apply
knowledge and skills acquired to effectively conduct policing operations and maintain
law and order.
Research Hypothesis
For the quantitative component, the statistical package for social sciences (SPSS)
was used to analyze the data collected. The data collected was coded and entered into
SPSS current version (V 20). A frequency was run to clean the data. Data entry errors
were corrected since all questionnaires were coded prior to entry. Restating the
hypotheses:
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H0: UNMIL’s police training made no difference relative to the maintenance of law and
order, and public confidence in Liberia’s police force.
H11: UNMIL’s police training effected change related to the maintenance of law and
order, and public confidence in the Liberia National Police Force.
The UNMIL training began in 2004. Police respondents agreed that they acquired
technical knowledge and skills during the UNMIL training through various courses
ranging from criminal investigation, civil protection and the rule of law to international
policing principles such as upholding human rights, equal protection of all citizens
including protection of potentially vulnerable groups (Table 17). Correlations and
regression were used to evaluate the hypotheses. There is a moderately significant
correlation between police perceived knowledge and skills gained during UNMIL
training and the job effectiveness perceived by them (r = -0.35). However, the
relationship is an inverse one, implying that as the knowledge gained increases, the job
performance cannot be associated in the same manner or direction. The implication is that
as more resources were being used in training the police, limited resources were used for
on the job performance which also formed the basis for a reduction in police
effectiveness.
In research question 2, I also explored issues revolving around the UNMIL’s
training decisions and coordination challenges that impacted on program results. The
issue of the need for psychological trauma counseling to police recruits was raised. The
findings show police respondents indicated the view that UNMIL did not consider trauma
healing or counseling important (Table 14: M=1.21). However, interview respondents
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expressed the view that some level of psychological counseling should have been
provided by UNMIL as an integral part of the training strategy. Respondents emphasized
that counseling was needed because the country was just emerging from conflict, and that
former combatants and criminals had found their way into the rank-and-file of the new
police force and some had even become supervisors. PO2, Commandant and Deputy
Director for Training at the Liberia National Police Academy, concurred with this view
and stressed that because the training was against the backdrop of the civil war, “there is
a need for psycho-social counseling for officers of the LNP. They need to tell their stories
in order to get healing. They need reconciliation too amongst themselves as some of their
supervisors were perpetrators of violence as members of the several belligerent forces.”
The earliest concerns about the UNMIL training program in addition to the
recruitment challenges were the diversity of the trainers and the nature and content of the
training. Trainers at the Liberia National Police Academy were international police
officers of contributing countries from around the world including Bangladesh, China,
Ghana, Great Britain, India, Israel, Jordan, Kenya, Kosovo, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan,
Russia, Sweden, Ukraine, United States, and Zimbabwe. After 2006, member countries
of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) also continued to
provide trainers from its member countries. Early in the program, Liberian officials
voiced their concerns over the diversity of trainers from different policing jurisdictions.
G3, a former Solicitor-General and now a Judge who earlier taught at the Liberia
National Police Academy, narrated his experience in response to the research question on
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whether or not the UNMIL training was coordinated and followed country-specific
guidelines:
“I am not sure of what it is today, but when the training started, it was not
coordinated. It was disjointed. For example, you have a group of trainers coming
from Ukraine; you have another group coming from Israel; you have another
group coming from Malaysia; you have another group coming from UK . . . so
our people were confused in the early days. They were taking training and
instructions from different people. . . . For example some trainers will tell our
people the way we march, the kinds of steps we take is wrong; that we should
take steps the other way like the British do: they hold their steps and throw it, they
hold their steps and throw it; unlike the US you take marching steps in beat. . .
some trainers trained to salute like the US do with your arm across your eyebrow;
some other trainers trained like the British do with your palm exposed above your
forehead . . . So they confused our trainees. One week or two weeks the people
from Russia will train them; another two weeks the people from Great Britain will
train them; another two weeks the people from Zimbabwe will train them . . . and
each of these came with their own methods of training. . . I know for a fact that
the discipline aspect was a problem also because one group of trainers were
telling police officers they are not supposed to greet or salute their seniors;
another group telling them no you must greet your seniors and pay respect to them
and it confused our people.”
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Table 17
LNP: Knowledge and Skills Competency of Police Officers (n= 60)
Knowledge and Skills Competency

Low

High

Mean

5.00

4.45

Std. Deviation

As a Police Officer who underwent the
UNMIL training, the content of the training

1.00

0.67
received was understood and comprehensive.
As a Police Officer, I acquired knowledge and
skills in civil protection during the UNMIL

2.00

5.00

4.57

0.59

4.00

5.00

4.60

0.49

2.00

5.00

4.28

0.64

impartial training of citizens is important in the 1.00

5.00

4.67

0.65

4.00

5.00

4.83

0.38

that all police officers must uphold basic human 2.00

5.00

4.80

0.51

1.00

5.00

3.41

1.37

knowledge that police power must be guided by 1.00

5.00

4.63

0.74

5.00

4.63

0.49

training.
As a Police Officer, I acquired knowledge and
skills in crime scene investigation and
prevention.
Training facilities and materials provided by
UNMIL were adequate and appropriate.
UNMIL training emphasized that fair and

exercise of police authority.
As a Police Officer, I acquired skills in case
file management and report writing.
As a Police Officer, I acquired knowledge and
skills in international police training principles

rights and equal protection of all citizens
against illegal acts under the law.
The UNMIL training emphasized that police
operations must encourage citizens to pressure
their government for their rights under the law.
During the UNMIL training, I acquired

the rule of law, not orders from public officials.
During the UNMIL training, I acquired
knowledge about the major role of police

4.00

officers during national political elections.

5.

Mean values: 1= Strongly Disagree, 2= Disagree, 3= Neither Disagree Nor Agree 4=
Agree, 5= Strongly Agree
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G2, a human rights lawyer and also former Solicitor-General of Liberia who later
taught criminal procedure at the Liberia National Police Academy, concurred with this
view and observed that the trainers came from various legal jurisdictions with different
policing traditions. For instance, in some of these jurisdictions, “police observance of
human rights and the rights of the accused is of lower standards than others.” He also
pointed out for example that the application of the Miranda Rights principle is not
something that is universal, and some countries do not observe it. They do not observe it
decidedly because Miranda came from the American jurisdiction and not all of the
common law countries practice it. Moreover, policing practices in some jurisdictions are
influenced by their political traditions. He pointed out that at one point for instance, the
head of UNMIL’s training program at the Liberia National Police Academy was a
Ukrainian woman and Ukrainian trainers were part of UNMIL’s core team of trainers.
However, “their political tradition come from the communist rule of the Soviet Union and
many of them were trained in the Soviet police tradition.” This was one of the major
confusions in the training program because the Liberia National Police “have not been
trained under a uniform criminal justice system and tradition.” UN4 supported this view
and acknowledged that the policing jurisdiction in Liberia is historically patterned after
the American model and the UNMIL’s intervention should have recognized that reality:
“I believe that many of these trainers who come have British police training; and
only few countries in the world have American training. So this for me is the
conflict. For me, mentors should understand that this area is America-specific
because of history and they should adapt and not force you any other way.”
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On the issue of the nature and course content of the training, two interview
respondents expressed the view that training was limited in content. For example,
according to PO2, “The UNMIL’s curriculum did not cover subjects like discipline and
courtesy, city and county geography, diplomatic immunity, forensics and defensive
tactics.” This view is shared by Friedman (2011), who argued that the UNMIL trainers
used materials and format that the UNPOL had utilized in other postconflict training
situations in Kosovo and later in East Timor. According to Freidman (2011), the training
manuals used by the UNMIL between 2004 through 2006 also did not cover subjects on
ethics, discipline, crime investigation, defensive tactics, and specialized training.
Respondents also stated that subjects covered were not discussed in-depth because the
training periods were short. From the onset, the training was largely fast tracked and
lasted about three months. On the average, trainers from different police jurisdictions
took turns conducting training on a bi-weekly basis.
Another critical theme that emerged was that the UNMIL’s training lacked
country-specific policing guidelines for Liberia. Respondents expressed the view that the
diversity or broadness of the base of trainers also diminished training content and police
on the job performance. According to them, UNMIL did not collaborate with the
Government of Liberia’s police administration to develop training contents and to
identify specific local skills, policing principles, culture, and guidelines, around which
UNMIL’s training activities, would revolve and be coordinated. Furuzawa (2009) argued
that international police reform programs must vary from one country to another and be
based on country-specific conditions in order to be successful. This view is shared by
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Pino and Wiatrowski (2006) who argued that international police training programs must
be implemented in ways that enable individual states “to be able to create their own
versions of policing based on standards embedded in democratic principles while
tailoring their reforms to their own socially determined goals and needs” (p. 9).
Responses from police participants also revealed that the Government of Liberia was less
involved in the recruitment (Table 15: M= 2.75) and in exercising oversight (Table 15:
M=2.18) to ensure that training was coordinated and its content was country-specific. The
training was conducted with little coordination between UNMIL and Government of
Liberia or between trainers from the various contributing countries who provided training
to recruits at the academy. However, the interview participants argued that UNMIL alone
should not take responsibility for this situation, but rather the Government of Liberia.
They argued that the Government of Liberia did not put itself in the position to take
ownership of the training program and did not provide much needed leadership and
direction in working with UNMIL to jointly develop a training framework. The idea was
that first they needed to conducting training needs assessment based on the country’s own
policing principles, guidelines and code. PO1, a former Commissioner of Police for
Administration and Professional Standards underscored this point:
“The Government does not see the LNP as its responsibility. It sees the LNP as a
responsibility of the international community, because it’s the international
community that started this whole idea of restructuring and reform and then they
put the money into it . . . the Government of Liberia through the Liberian National
Police had to accept whatever was provided to them based on the funding
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available by the donating country; and in most cases they sent their own experts.
And so if you look at the Liberian National Police today, the entire force received
different trainings – some received Jordanian training, some from Nepal, some
from Pakistan, some from Nigeria, Ghana, some from America, it depended on
whatever fund was available.”
After 2006, different trainers continued to conduct training based on the values of
their own police jurisdictions. UN2 acknowledged that values are important and vary
within the police force of each jurisdiction. He argued however, that although trainers
brought their own set of values from their various jurisdictions, they used police training
manuals based on the Liberian Penal Code. G1, G2, G3, and CSO4 disagreed. They
argued that while the Liberian Penal Code was used, manuals produced and utilized on
the various topics covered were not Liberia-specific because to that date, UNMIL had not
involved the Ministry of Justice in the development of a comprehensive training manual
for the Liberian National Police. G2, made the following observations about UNMIL
police training manuals:
“I was trying to teach from a material produced by UNMIL on criminal procedure
and like they just took it from the Internet. Somewhere there I saw “federal” and I
said we don’t have federal here. So the training manual needs to be properly
developed with the aid of the Justice Ministry . . . because at the end of the day
police work affects what the lawyers, and the prosecutors do. The collection of
evidence is based on the kind of training they received from different people who
come from different police jurisdictions and traditions. So it’s better for the
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Ministry of Justice to develop training manual . . . We are a common law country
but we have a different jurisdiction so we need that because some of the capacity
problem in the police is based upon the nature of the training that they receive. I
think it is a fundamental issue that the justice system has to get over. We have to
have a uniform training manual.”
UN1 concurred with the view that Liberia did not have its own set of local policing
principles and guidelines, which would identify specific skills around which UNMIL’s
training activities, would revolve and be coordinated. He cautioned that:
“My experience in other missions and in Sierra Leone where we had police
reform is that when police come from different parts of the world, they are
influenced by different doctrines and how that is coordinated locally to deliver
their training is something that maybe needs to be looked at carefully; and if the
country also does not have its own policing principles and guidelines it could
create the room for controversies and in the end it may lead to Liberia not having
a kind of unified code for police.”
CSO4, CSO5 and CSO6 concurred with this view and reiterated that acquisition and use
of local knowledge in handling policing operations was critical and needed to be captured
and taught. CSO4 maintained that:
“I think this is what has been absent in most of the interventions not just the
interventions with the police, of course we are talking about police now. I think in
most of the interventions how we did things here before, the real use of local
knowledge and managing local knowledge really have been absent in most of
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what we have seen coming from the UN and the international circles. Most of the
lessons learned have to come from outside. That’s true we want standards but we
also supposed to recognize our uniqueness as a country. We have a particular
context and a particular history and that should be the basis upon which we should
do all of these interventions.”
In 2006, UNMIL determined there was a need to revise its approaches to police
reform interventions in Liberia. According to Freidman (2011), some of its training
coordinators had resolved that the curriculum compromised quality for quantity and that
it favored producing a large number of officers quickly. They argued that the curriculum
was more suited for training of interim police officers than for the development of a
sustainable long-term police force. Since 2006, UNMIL revised and updated its training
curriculum with manuals that covered subjects on democratic policing, human rights and
international policing principles, criminal investigation, community policing concepts,
case file management, and report writing. It also covered subjects on police
administration, policies and procedures, ethics, and discipline reflecting best practices.
Before that time however, UNMIL had trained and deployed 2000 police officers who
did not benefit from the contents of its revised training curriculum and other new
program approaches (Secretary General’s Report to the UN Security Council S/2006/958,
2006).
Interview respondents also argued that even some of the revised program
approaches that UNMIL had determined to implement after 2006 were hampered by its
earlier decisions. For example, UNMIL decided to build the local capacity of the police

108
through the training of Liberian trainers. However, the new officers trained and deployed
by UNMIL lacked the practical experience to serve as effective trainers. According to
G1, UNMIL’s efforts were also hampered by decisions it had made from the onset to
deactivate all former ranking officers of the old LNP, although many of them had not
committed human rights abuses, and they possessed significant experiences to serve as
future trainers. G1 explained:
“We even argued that . . . you need to have people with more experience; some
old hands in the business to be here to serve as mentors of these people. But
UNMIL refused. They recruited people entirely new; many of them young people
who had been involved into all kinds of things.”
The UNMIL’s recruitment and vetting practices improved and became more thorough
between 2006 and 2013, although its overall reform program was also still not locally
owned. The training manuals still did not include materials specific to policing operations
in Liberia. Trainers still came in from the West African region and from different
policing jurisdictions around the world.
The impact of the UNMIL’s training on the LNP was also assessed in the context
of citizens’ perception of training acquired based on demonstrated performance including
fair and impartial treatment of all citizens. Police and civil society respondents in the
survey agreed that an effective national police force was crucial for maintaining law and
order (Table 18: M=4.6). However, the perception of civil society respondents regarding
police training was that the performance of the UNMIL trained police did not reflect
training acquired (Table 19: M=2.56).
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Table 18
Police Job Performance as Perceived by the Police Participants (n= 60)

An effective Liberia National Police Force is crucial for maintaining
law and order after UNMIL leaves Liberia.
Crime rates are still high today
Crime rates are still high today because the Liberia National Police
do not respond to crime scenes effectively.
The Liberia National Police are not able to respond timely to crime
scenes.
The problem with effective response of the Liberia National Police
is more related to the lack of authority to bear arms.
The problem with effective response of the Liberia National Police
is more related to the lack of equipment.
Residents of the local communities do not trust the LNP
A citizen cannot get a fair redress if he or she files a complaint
against a police officer to his or her superiors.

Low

High

Mean*

Std.
Deviat
ion

1.00

5.00

4.67

0.86

1.00

5.00

2.98

1.17

1.00

5.00

2.78

1.21

1.00

6.00

4.32

0.98

1.00

5.00

2.95

1.41

1.00

5.00

4.70

0.65

1.00

5.00

2.75

1.19

1.00

5.00

2.43

1.23

1.00

5.00

2.72

1.34

1.00

5.00

4.37

0.66

1.00

5.00

3.83

1.12

1.00

5.00

2.20

1.04

1.00

5.00

3.48

1.00

2.00

5.00

4.78

0.61

1.00

5.00

3.68

1.49

The Liberia National police used excessive force during the
elections incident involving some members and supporters of the
CDC political party on November 8, 2011.
Some members of the Liberia National Police were involved in
some of the crimes committed today in the country.
The Liberia National Police today are corrupt.
Liberia National Police today are more corrupt than Police before
the civil war.
Liberia National Police today are less corrupt than the Police before
the civil war.
The problem of corruption in the police is more related to poor
salary and lack of benefits for officers.
The Liberia National Police today is not effective and capable to
maintain law and order after UNMIL leaves Liberia.

5.

Mean values: 1= Strongly Disagree, 2= Disagree, 3= Neither Disagree Nor Agree 4=
Agree, 5= Strongly Agree
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Table 19
Police Job Performance as Perceived by the Civil Society Participants (n= 60)
Low

High

Mean*

Std.
Dev
iati
on

1.00

5.00

4.50

0.81

1.00

5.00

2.56

1.28

1.00

5.00

3.67

1.23

1.00

5.00

4.00

1.07

1.00

5.00

2.07

1.09

neighborhood, I prefer to call my neighbor first before 1.00

5.00

4.40

1.03

1.00

4.00

2.05

0.82

1.00

5.00

4.50

0.83

1.00

5.00

4.18

0.98

National Police is more related to the lack of authority 1.00

5.00

2.95

1.42

5.00

4.33

0.91

An effective Liberia National Police Force is crucial
for maintaining law and order after UNMIL leaves
Liberia
The performance of the UNMIL trained police
shows that they acquired the needed knowledge and
capacity for effective police work.
Crime rates are still high today.
Crime rates are still high today because the Liberia
National Police do not respond to crime scenes
effectively.
I trust that the Liberia National Police are able to
effectively respond to crime in my neighborhood.
If I noticed a crime being committed in my
I call the Liberia National Police.
I feel more secured in the community in which I live
because of the professional job the Liberia National
Police is doing.
The Liberia National Police are not able to respond
timely to crime scenes.
The Liberia National Police today are likely to
protect the government more than the citizens.
The problem with effective response of the Liberia
to bear arms.
The problem with effective response of the Liberia
National Police is more related to the lack of
equipment.

1.00
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Low

Residents of the local communities do not trust the

High

Mean*

Std.
Dev
iati
on
1.17

1.00

5.00

3.87

1.00

5.00

4.02

1.10

2.00

5.00

4.30

0.77

involved in some of the crimes committed today in the 2.00

5.00

4.53

0.65

1.00

5.00

3.38

1.11

1.00

5.00

4.50

0.68

1.00

5.00

3.44

1.18

1.00

5.00

2.54

1.16

1.00

5.00

4.57

0.74

1.00

5.00

3.90

1.33

Liberia National Police.
A citizen cannot get a fair redress if he or she files a
complaint against a police officer to his or her
superiors.
The Liberia National Police Officers do not treat all
citizens fairly and impartially when they investigate
cases.
Some members of the Liberia National Police were
country.
The Liberia National police used excessive force
during the elections incident involving some members
and supporters of the Congress for Democratic Change
political party on November 8, 2011.
The Liberia National Police today are corrupt.
Liberia National Police today are more corrupt than
Police before the civil war.
Liberia National Police today are less corrupt than
Police before the civil war.
The problem of corruption in the police is more
related to salary and lack of benefits for officers.
The Liberia National Police today is not effective
and capable to maintain law and order after UNMIL
leaves Liberia.

5.

Mean values: 1= Strongly Disagree, 2= Disagree, 3= Neither Disagree Nor Agree 4=
Agree, 5= Strongly Agree

112

Table 20
Police Views About Crime Rates Over the Years Using Today as a Reference Point
Low

High

Mean*

Std.
Deviation

1.00

3.00

2.03

0.32

1.00

3.00

2.03

0.32

1.00

3.00

2.02

0.43

1.00

4.00

1.60

0.67

a) Do you believe that the crime rate
today is higher, lower or about the
same than in the years between 20042005?
b) Do you believe that the crime rate
today is higher, lower or about the
same than in the years between 20062007?
c) Do you believe that the crime rate
today is higher, lower or about the
same than in the years between 20082009?
d) Do you believe that the crime rate
today is higher, lower or about the
same than in the years between 20102011?

5.

Mean values: 1= About the same, 2= Lower, 3= Higher
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Table 21
Civil Society Views About Crime Rates Over the Years Using Today as a Reference
Low

High

Mean*

Std.
Dev
iati
on

1.00

3.00

2.17

0.56

1.00

3.00

2.10

0.66

1.00

3.00

2.02

0.70

1.00

3.00

1.78

0.74

a) Do you believe that crime the crime rate today is
higher, lower or about the same than in the years
between 2004-2005?
b) Do you believe that crime the crime rate today is
higher, lower or about the same than in the years
between 2006-2007?
c) Do you believe that crime the crime rate today is
higher, lower or about the same than in the years
between 2008-2009?
d) Do you believe that crime the crime rate today is
higher, lower or about the same than in the years
between 2010-2011?

5.

Mean values: 1= about the same, 2= Lower, 3= Higher

The effectiveness on job performance measured the ability of the police to
effectively conduct policing operations and maintain law and order. The regression based
on the analysis of variance (ANOVA) shows a significant relationship between
knowledge gained and police job performance (Table 22). This meant that police job
performance is the result of the training acquired, thus implying that UNMIL’s police
training effected some relative changes related to the maintenance of law and order. This
significant relationship further implies that police effectiveness would be higher if their
capacity regarding logistics and materials for job performance were adequately provided.
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Table 22
Relationship Between Police Knowledge, Skills Level and Job Performance
N
Police Knowledge and skills level
60
Police Job Effectiveness Perceived by Police
** Correlation is statistically significant at p ≤ .01

Mean
(SD)
4.50 (.31)
3.31 (.44)

R
-.35**

p(2
tail)
.008

Table 23
Analysis of Variance (ANOVAa)
Model

Sum of Squares Df
Mean Square F
Sig.
Regression 1.426
1
1.426
7.587
.008b
1
Residual
10.522
56
.188
Total
11.948
57
a. Dependent Variable: Police Job performance perceived by police
b. Predictors: (Constant), Computed police knowledge and skills competency

Effectiveness of job performance was measured in the context of (a) the ability of
the UNMIL trained police to maintain law and order after UNMIL leaves Liberia; (b)
Police protection of citizens and government; and (c) Citizens’ trust of police to bear
arms in order to effectively fight crime. Police survey respondents neither disagreed nor
agreed (Table 18: M=3.68) that the UNMIL trained police was capable to maintain law
and order when UNMIL leaves Liberia at the end of its mission. Civil society survey
respondents also neither disagreed nor agreed (Table 19: M=3.90). However, a majority
of interview respondents expressed the view that they did not believe that the Liberia
National Police was capable to maintain law and order after UNMIL leaves Liberia. They
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point to challenges in UNMIL’s recruitment and vetting process, need for psycho-social
counseling, additional training to increase the size of the police to the population and to
improve the character of the police, resources and improved conditions of work, and the
need to build a people-oriented police force as preconditions to ensure performance
effectiveness after UNMIL leaves Liberia. UN4 emphasized that the question of the
capability of the LNP to take the place of UNMIL:
“Means that you need to build a people-oriented police . . . . For example if you
recruit me into the police, send me to the community I came from, it is very
difficult for me to halt people in my community. Because they know me . . . and I
want to prove to them that I am here to serve you, but . . . I am going to be firm,
and they understand that . . . So that’s one approach to make the police more
people oriented, more people focused. For this I don’t think they have achieved.
So before UNMIL leaves, if they can cover that gap, then to a large extent there
will be respect for the police, and the police will also respect the citizens. Number
two, I still believe the number of the police to the population is still small.
Number three I think equipment is very, very vital, not necessarily weapons,
because weapons have a way of providing false confidence to the carrier . . .”
On the issue of police protection, civil society respondents agreed that the police
are likely to protect government more than citizens (Table 19: M=4.18). PO2 expressed
the view that the culture by which police power is applied in the interest of the state or on
orders of public officials for political ends (Sawyer, 1992) has not changed: “Nothing has
actually changed. We still have and continue to maintain the colonial state structure,
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which is state-centric and not people-centric. So the police will protect the government
more than the people.” G2 cited an example in which high school students staged a
peaceful protest on March 22, 2011 in solidarity with their teachers who were on strike
for lack of payment of their salaries. Attempts by police to quell the protest resulted in
use of excessive force by which several students were brutalized, leaving some students
with serious injuries. According to G2, “one of them, a handicap student took fifteen
stitches on her head.” The Commission set up to investigate the incident recommended
that several senior police officers who were involved should be dismissed and some
should be suspended. G2, who chaired the Commission that investigated the incident and
made the recommendations, said that when the President of Liberia received the report,
“she thought that the recommendations were harsh.” G2 took the President’s expression
to mean that “at the highest level, the President must have felt that the police acted in the
interest of the government, to protect government’s image; because protests of students in
the streets shouting ‘pay our teachers’ was an anti-government protest.” UN4 expressed
the view that the behavior of the police is often impacted by a fear of consequences:
“One must first understand and be trained to that level that if I stand on the
citizens’ side, the state will support; the citizens will support. What are the
consequences of me supporting the citizens rather than the state? So the fear of
consequences alone is a deterrence to make the police more on the government
side.”
PO4 concurred and explained that “most police officers are afraid of losing their job, so
they work in the interest of the government and not the public as required.” UN3
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expressed the view that there have been cases in which the police have been seen taking
the side of the government when the situation involved citizens from different political
parties other than the ruling party. CSO2 argued that “The Police Director and most of
the people in the police force are appointed by the president and can be dismissed by the
President . . . so that keeps the police tied to the Chief Executive . . . and they are going to
protect people in the government more than the they will protect the citizens.”
The sub-components of effectiveness on job performance were public confidence and
police conduct. Public confidence measured the extent of citizens’ self-assurance in the
ability of the police to provide fair, impartial, and equal treatment to all citizens in the
exercise of police authority, and to respond effectively and timely to crime. Police
conduct measured behaviors and practices of police officers which impact on police
integrity.
On public confidence or the fair and impartial treatment of citizens in the exercise
of police authority, civil society respondents agreed (Table 19) that they do not get fair
and impartial treatment from the police: (a) when they investigate their cases (M=4.30);
(b) when they file complaints against police officers to their superiors (M=4.02). These
views were corroborated by interview respondents. However, they also argued that most
often this was the result of interference from superior officers. CSO6 expressed the view
that it depends on who is involved:
“if it is between a government official and you, it is not fairly done because they
prioritize. But if it is you against your colleague, because I have witnessed some,
they investigate fairly and even sometimes some of the police can be very rigid ...

118
but sometimes there is interference by calls from somewhere above telling them
to let that person go; calls from above from senior police officers in the central
office or sometimes from higher cabinet ministers.”
The extent of public confidence in the police was also measured in the context of
police responses to crime. Police officers who participated in the survey agreed that
despite the knowledge and skills acquired as the result of the UNMIL’s training, they
were not able to respond effectively and timely to crimes and crime scenes (Table 18:
M=4.32); although they disagreed that crime rates are still high today (M=2.98); and they
linked this problem to lack of equipment (M= 4.70). Civil society survey respondents
strongly agreed with the police assessment that the police do not respond effectively to
crimes and crime scenes (Table 19: M= 4.50). They did not link this problem to the
police’s lack of authority to bear arms (M= 2.95) but rather to the lack of equipment (M=
4.33). However, interview respondents G1 and CSO5 argued that the issue of the lack of
equipment does not apply in all cases and should not be used as an excuse. G1 stressed
the point that “You can’t say for such a crime as murder, that because I don’t have a
vehicle so I can’t go to investigate . . .” CSO5 concurred, arguing that “So everybody just
sit down and make that excuse about equipment. Yes, we know equipment is very key . . .
to do evidence gathering, forensic and all of that . . . but what were we doing in the past?
So we shouldn’t just use it as excuse to cover up for our inefficiencies.” UN4 concurred
and made a distinction between police roles. He argued that while some police roles
require equipment, there are most other roles “that require just presence, policemen
everywhere and just surveillance. You know where those criminals are. You don’t need
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all the weapons in the world. You just need the numbers and people carrying out shifts;
so you need human resources there.” G3, CSO6, and PO1 argued that when you train a
police force and deploy them to undertake the task of maintaining law and order,
equipment and other needed resources and incentives must be provided as part of the
support that yields performance effectiveness. According to G3, “you must give them the
tools to work with” because equipment and resources are the complementary aspects of
the training that support effective performance in the field. According to G3,
“The police have been trained in forensic investigation; but they do not have the
equipment to carry out those forensic investigations . . . some travel abroad and
train in properly equipped laboratories; they come back to Liberia, there are no
laboratories . . . if you transfer police officers from one county to another, they do
not have barracks where to stay. They have to go and pay rent; and the rent is
coming from their basic salary. There is no rent allowance; there is no housing
allowance; there is no transport allowance. They have to beg to take car to get to
work. It is unfair to the police.”
Civil society survey respondents also agreed that crime rates are lower today compared to
earlier years, but agreed that crime rates today are still high because police do not
respond timely and effectively to crimes in their neighborhoods (Table 21: M=4.00). In
the event of a crime in progress, respondents also agreed they prefer to call their
neighbors first before they call the police (Table 19: M=4.40). The majority of interview
respondents agreed with this view. They point to the development of neighborhood watch
groups as community responses to the problem of ineffective police response. According
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to UN3, however, poor organization and lack of control over these groups also led to
proliferation of mob actions or “street justice” in the neighborhoods.
G2 also reasoned that the value in calling one’s neighbor first is also that your
neighbor “provides your first line of evidence, at least somebody will see something
happening to you so when the police comes later on, whenever they get to you at least
you have someone to corroborate what you say happened to you.” Respondents, who
indicated the view that they would call the police first, reasoned that the police are
responsible to enforce the law. According to CSO6,
“Your neighbor will do it family way. And if for instance I found somebody
raping my child, I call the neighbor, they will say let’s settle it the family way.
But the police will be able to apprehend that person, put that whole case under
control and see how best they can take your case to court”.
The issue was also raised on the need for the police to be authorized to carry arms in
order to carry out effective police operations. On this issue, civil society respondents
agreed that the problem with effective response of the police is related to a lack of
equipment (Table 19: M=4.33). However, equipment did not include arms. Respondents
disagreed that police should bear arms in order to do effective police work. Police
respondents concurred with this view (Table 18: M=2.25) that they did not need arms in
order to do effective police work. Interview respondents agreed with the views of police
and civil society respondents. They also indicated that they did not trust their police to
bear arms because of the vetting process which allowed former combatants and criminals
to be recruited into the police force.
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Police conduct measured behaviors and practices of police officers which
impacted on police integrity and public confidence. Police conduct was measured in the
context of corruption and crime. Interview respondents defined corruption as unethical
behaviors and practices such as drinking, taking of drugs while on duty, collection of
bribes from motorists, parties to investigations and to court cases involving presentation
of evidence by the police, all of which have negative impact on police integrity and
public confidence. The police has not broken away from its discredited past. Analysis of
responses from the survey questionnaire, interviews, documents, and field notes revealed
that the UNMIL training had no impact on police integrity. On the issue of crime, police
respondents agreed that police officers have been involved in some of the crimes
committed around the country (Table 18: M=4.18). Civil society respondents agreed with
the police assessment (Table 19: M=4.53). Police and civil society respondents linked
this result to UNMIL’s recruitment and vetting practices. On the issue of corruption,
police and civil society respondents agreed that the Liberia National Police are corrupt. A
culture of corruption is sustained by a culture of unfavorable conditions of work.
However, police and civil society respondents linked police corruption more to
unfavorable working conditions such as poor salary, lack of transportation, and benefits
such as housing, medical care, and pension programs for officers.
The analysis of variance (ANOVA) showed a significant relationship between
knowledge gained and police job performance, meaning that the police job performance
is the result of the training acquired (Table 23). The implication is that the UNMIL has
conducted the theoretical training in relation to police field work in classroom settings

122
and field locations. However, this does not necessarily imply that the LNP have adequate
logistics and other resources needed to enable them perform effectively. Other conditions
of service, complementary to training, include salary, benefits, equipment, and resources.
These are fundamental factors of effective performance that enable the police to respond
effectively to crime scenes and to calls from communities for protection. Respondents
G1, PO2, and CSO6 argue that better conditions of service including salary and benefits
is one of the fundamental factors of motivation, especially in Liberia where poverty is on
the increase.
Research Question 3
Are there current challenges that require reform to improve the quality of policing and
ensure a reliable police security force in Liberia?
This question sought to assess the critical lessons learned from responses to
Research Questions 1 and 2 regarding the UNMIL’s training program and how the
findings point to challenges that require reforms in order to improve the quality of
policing in Liberia. Question 3 also explored challenges perceived by the citizens about
their new police force and what respondents believed must be done to build a
professional police force capable of providing equal protection to all citizens, while
upholding their basic human rights and maintaining law and order. The findings in
Research Questions 1 and 2 point to several internal and external challenges in UNMIL’s
training program. These challenges were examined from two perspectives: (a) The
UNMIL; and (b) The Government of Liberia.
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From the perspective of the UNMIL, challenges that required reform were
examined from three angles: (a) recruitment decisions; (b) local content; and (c) training
methodology. The key findings in the UNMIL’s recruitment decisions are that it failed to
observe established UN mission standards for recruitment and vetting, to communicate
the message to the population that the new police being organized was for individuals
with good character, and that policing is for individuals with records of good conduct and
behavior. UNMIL failed to consult the population in the local communities in the
recruitment process. Although it posted pictures of candidates around the country and
asked citizens to speak out and point individuals who had committed human rights
abuses, UNMIL did not provide the needed security protection to encourage their
participation in the vetting of candidates. Moreover, the UNMIL’s preference for quantity
in recruitment of large numbers of candidates compromised quality in the context of
establishing a sustainable long-term police force. All of these were the additional adverse
impacts on the outcome of the training program.
I found that the majority of respondents emphasized their concern about the
UNMIL’s controlling influence over the program from the onset. According to G1 and
PO2, although there was a joint transitional working group collaborating on the training
program, UNMIL had insisted that as the experts, they had to make the final decisions.
They cited as an example, the decision taken by UNMIL to deactivate and disband the
entire old Liberian National police force and to build a police force that is entirely new.
The challenge that this created was the absence of institutional knowledge and memory
and the absence of experienced police leadership that would have provided mentoring to
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new officers. All of these were the additional adverse impacts on the outcome of the
training program. The UNMIL’s Liberian counterparts had argued unsuccessfully in
favor of retention of some of the ranking officers in the old disbanded force. They had
argued that some of the ranking officers of the old police force who had not committed
human rights abuses should be retained to serve as mentors for the new recruits. The
challenges from these lapses were: (1) individuals who committed heinous crimes against
the population were recruited and are now serving in the new police force with some
serving as ranking officers, and this also impacts on the morale of the rank-and-file; (2)
some police officers trained and deployed have been involved in crimes around the
country for which the citizens do not trust their police; and (3) there was a lack of
effective leaders in the new police force who can provide leadership by example. The
rank-and-file admittedly engaged in corrupt activities, while some senior commanders
frequently interfered in investigations for social, financial and political ends. Still, others
are caught engaging crimes such as drug trafficking.
On the issue of local content, respondents indicated their concern that courses
taught by UNMIL at the academy did not include country-specific contents for Liberia.
According to them, UNMIL did not collaborate with the government’s security sector
regime to develop and include course contents that have specific local skills and policing
guidelines around which UNMIL’s training activities would revolve. Training manuals
used in earlier missions and brought to Liberia were not revised to adapt to the country’s
policing context and history.
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Another critical theme that emerged was the UNMIL’s training methodology. The
earliest concerns about the UNMIL training program, in addition to the recruitment
challenges, were the diversity of the trainers and the nature and content of the training.
Trainers came from different countries with diverse social and political backgrounds and
contrasting policing jurisdictions. The research found that as the result of the broadness
of the base of trainers and the restricted course content, the overall output of the
UNMIL’s police training was not country-specific to Liberia and that police trained and
deployed have different policing orientations and values.
From the perspective of the Government of Liberia, challenges that required
reform were examined from three angles: (a) UNMIL-GoL coordination challenges; (b)
GoL support to police reform and capacity challenges; and (c) political interference in
policing operations. Analysis of the survey results, transcripts from the interviews,
documents and field notes revealed that the support of the Government of Liberia is
complementary to the UNMIL’s training and necessary to ensure effectiveness of
performance. However, the findings reflect that the government’s direct support in this
regard had been minimal, instead it had relied on international donor support. On the
issue of political interference, respondents expressed concern over the government’s
continued control over the administration of the police through political appointment of
ranking officers. The President of Liberia appoints the top brass. The individuals
appointed are most often not from within the organization. Internal promotions have also
followed no set criteria for merit based on performance, experience, and tenure. All of
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these factors have historically demoralized the police rank-and-file, dissuaded
motivation, and adversely impacted on the development of a professional police force.
Chapter Summary
In Chapter 4, I analyzed the data, discussed the research results and presented the
findings. The overarching research question that guided this study was: How has police
training by the United Nations Mission in Liberia affected police effectiveness and public
confidence in the ability of the LNP to maintain law and order? This question was
expanded by two qualitative questions and one quantitative question. In Research
Question 1, I assessed the UNMIL’s strategy for recruitment and vetting of applicants for
the new LNP, in the context of thoroughness applied in the process to ensure that only
applicants who had not committed human rights abuses and who had demonstrated good
behavior in the local communities were recruited. The UNMIL’s recruitment and vetting
procedures were not thorough and did not adhere to United Nations international police
reform standards. In Research Question 2, I assessed training and citizens’ perception of
training based on observed police performance. The training was not uniform and did not
include a country-specific context for Liberia. The broadness of the base of trainers from
diverse and contrasting police jurisdictions diminished training effectiveness and
undermined the effectiveness of performance of the police. Participants’ responses to
Research Question 3 affirmed that there were current challenges that required reform to
establish a professional police force that is in synch with its policing jurisdiction and is
effective and capable of maintaining law and order in Liberia. The LNP currently faces
several challenges that impede effective performance. These challenges require reform
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and re-orientation interventions by UNMIL and the Government of Liberia. In Chapter 5,
I briefly discuss the conclusions and present my recommendations for positive social
change based on the findings.
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Chapter 5: Conclusions and Recommendations
Introduction
In this chapter, I present the conclusions based on the findings, critical lessons
learned, and the recommendations. I conducted the on location in Monrovia, Liberia. I
conducted the study in the wake of the country’s fight to eradicate the Ebola epidemic
under conditions of emergency management public policy challenges never before
experienced in Liberia nor in the West African subregion. Participants in the study were
from the government, community-based civil society organizations, the LNP, and the UN
mission in Liberia. The mixed-model research method was used to collect and analyze
the data. The purpose of this study was to gain a deeper understanding of how the
UNMIL’s police training and reform interventions have affected the capacity of the LNP
to effectively maintain law and order and gain public confidence. The objective of the
study was to identify the underlying contexts and to contribute knowledge to the
establishment of an effective police force that gains the trust and confidence of the
citizens of Liberia.
I can conclude, based on the findings, that the UNMIL’s police training program
has yielded mixed results and impacts on the effectiveness of police performance in
Liberia. The deficiencies in the UNMIL’s police training and reform interventions reflect
a broader problem of shortcomings in various reform programs implemented by the UN
and other international nongovernmental organizations in Liberia. Sawyer (2005)
emphasized that the greater shortcomings in the implementation of reform programs are
lack of guidance of a long-term larger vision for a postconflict society, the lack of
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effective coordination amongst implementing agencies, and their failure to engage
Liberians as stakeholders in designing and implementing these programs. In the case of
UNMIL, the police training program took place in a new global environment under
country-specific realities and conditions that informed how training intervention for the
LNP ought to have happened in order to establish a country-specific professional police
force that gains local ownership. In an analysis of the results of the survey questionnaire,
interview transcripts, and field notes, I found that the UNMIL training of the LPN was
impacted by what Durch (2010) referred to as a “crisis of strategy” from the onset (p. 8).
Respondents emphasized that UNMIL was not well-informed about its mission
environment in Liberia and did not seek much needed guidance from the local security
sector regime.
The adverse impacts, however, are not entirely training related but result also
from negative externalities emanating from the behavior of the government of Liberia
towards its police force. Policing in Liberia takes place in a political environment of an
entrenched centralized, imperial presidential system in which political leaders do not
place a premium on the mission of the police, and therefore on its organization and
administration even in its postconflict state. The future implications of the results are that
the UNMIL and the government of Liberia need to heighten collaboration to implement a
comprehensive program of professionalizing the police before the UNMIL’s departure
from Liberia. They must jointly respond to the need to rehabilitate, retrain, and
reorientate the LNP and to situate it in its original uniform common law criminal justice
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system and policing tradition, which is specifically patterned after that of the United
States.
The conclusions and recommendations are presented in two parts based on
Research Questions 1 and 2. Question 3 was a restatement of the critical lessons learned
and the challenges that informed the recommendations. In each part, the findings are
summarized to provide the basis for the conclusions and the recommendations for
positive social change based on each research question from the perspectives of (a) the
UNMIL and (b) the government of Liberia.
Research Question 1
What strategies were used to recruit applicants for police training?
The UNMIL Perspective
In the findings for Question 1, I found that the UNMIL’s approach to recruitment
and vetting of candidates was adhoc. Candidates were not investigated with due diligence
regarding their character and previous human rights records. The UNMIL’s recruitment
and vetting practices were not exhaustive. The procedures were not thorough and did not
adhere to the standards applied in other UN police reform missions such as in BosniaHerzegovina, East Timor, and Kosovo. Citizens in the local communities were not
consulted in the vetting process regarding prior behaviors and character of applicants. In
conclusion, UNMIL’s failure to apply due diligence in the recruitment of candidates
resulted in the admission of known criminals and former combatants of the warring
factions who had committed human rights abuses during the civil war. To date, they
continue to serve in the rank-and-file and leadership of the new LNP.
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On the issue of police integrity, I also found that psychological counseling was
needed as part of the training package because the country was just emerging from 14
years of conflict from which the people were traumatized. Former combatants, criminals,
and individuals with questionable character had found their way into the rank-and-file of
the new police force and some had even become supervisors. In Question 1, I further
concluded that the admission of former combatants, criminals, and individuals with
questionable character was partly responsible for the citizens’ lack of trust in the new
police to bear arms. It also bears on a crisis of public confidence in the integrity of the
police as an instrument for peace-building given that some of the UNMIL trained officers
were found to be involved in various crimes, such as armed robberies and drug
smuggling around the country.
The Government Perspective
From the perspective of the government, the participants also raised the critical
issue of the weak commitment by the government to its police training program. PO1,
PO2, and G3 argued that the government of Liberia did not put itself in the position to
take ownership of the UNMIL training program to provide much needed leadership and
direction in working with UNMIL to jointly develop a training framework. In the view of
respondents, taking ownership meant providing funding for the training or for some
aspects of it instead of relying entirely on the international community. Had the
government committed to taking ownership of the training program, it would have been
able to insist on country-specific training and orientation. That is, it would have been in
the position to decide on the direction of the training and also decide on which training it
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would accept for the LNP and which training it would reject. To the contrary, the
government compromised its position by failing to take responsibility for its police
training program. It had to accept whatever training was available based on funding
provided by any given country.
Recommendation 1
The United Nations must require future postconflict international police reform
missions to:
(a) Ensure that joint efforts in recruitment and vetting must go beyond consultations
with officials of the local security sector regime to ascertain participation of local
community-based civil society members in an inclusive process of postconflict
police and security sector reform;
(b) Emphasize participation of the local communities in the vetting of candidates for
the police force and provide immediate security and protection for the citizens as
the basis for their participation in the vetting of candidates;
(c) Communicate recruitment standards through local languages, while articulating
the need for applicants with good character; inform residents in the local
communities that police applicants should be people who have good character and
good human rights backgrounds; and
(d) In the case of Liberia, UNMIL and the government of Liberia must jointly
implement a periodic and revolving program of psychological counseling and
rehabilitation for all members of the current police force. This should include the
rank-and-file as well as the leadership.
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A key component of any international reform intervention is a strong partnership
and effective coordination between the mission and the local authorities to jointly provide
program direction and support. In the findings to question 1, participants raised the issue
of the UNMIL’s controlling influence over the training program. According to G1 and
PO2, although there was a joint transitional working group collaborating on the training
program, UNMIL had insisted that as the experts, they had to make the final decisions.
For example, participants referred to the case of UNMIL’s decision to deactivate the
entire old LNP and to build a police force that is entirely new. On this issue, UNMIL’s
Liberian implementing partners had requested that some of the ranking officers of the
disbanded old police who had not committed human rights abuses should be retained to
serve as mentors for the new recruits. Respondents emphasized that UNMIL refused and
none of the ranking officers of the old disbanded police was recruited. However, the
literature supports the position of the UNMIL’s Liberian counterparts. A study by
Glebbeek (2001) on police reform in Guatemala showed that the process did not succeed
and faced significant challenges because it involved a decision to abolish the entire old
police force and to establish a new force bereft of members of the old institution. In
contrast, a similar police reform study done by Stanley (2006) on statebuilding in El
Salvador found that the strategy for building a new police force from bottom-up was
successful because it provided for continuity and grounded experience in the process by
the inclusion of some members of the old police force. In conclusion, I found in Question
1 that the recommendation for retention of some of the ranking officers of the old
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disbanded LNP to ensure continuity would have been a successful strategy. This strategy
was adopted by UN police training missions in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and in East Timor
and yielded successful results. It should have been adopted by the UNMIL in Liberia.
The impacts of the failure to provide for institutional memory and organizational
continuity were reflected in leadership capacity gaps of the new LNP. Respondents
emphasized the point that as the result of this decision, the LNP lacked capacity in terms
of experience and the competencies associated with law enforcement leadership such as
administration of the police revolving around the ability to mentor subordinates, exercise
command and control, and providing overall leadership.
Recommendation 2
Future UN police training missions must be guided by the general standard of a
strong partnership and collaboration to integrate, rehabilitate and strengthen what is
found on the ground in the host country. The mission must collaborate with its local
counterparts to reform the institution it finds on the ground and to place it in synch with
contemporary international policing principles and standards. The overall police reform
goal need not be to disband the structure is found on the ground; but rather to rebuild and
strengthened it through a jointly developed program of integration, rehabilitation, and reorientation specific to the policing needs of the host country.
Research Question 2
What, if any, difference has the UNMIL’s police training made relative to the
maintenance of law and order, and public confidence in Liberia’s police force?
The UNMIL Perspective
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A critical concern raised by respondents was the weak collaborative relationship
and coordination between the UNMIL and its local police administration counterparts in
the implementation of the training program. Although a joint transitional team for
designing and administering the training existed, I found that UNMIL made the final
decisions that were critical to the direction of the program (Freidman, 2011). In the
process, the UNMIL did not coordinate its activities with the other implementing partners
to ensure that the nature and direction of its police training intervention was countryspecific to the context and history of Liberia and to its criminal justice system. This is the
key challenge which points to the need for additional training, rehabilitation, and reorientation to exact this country-specific policing context. In Question 2 I also found that
course materials and contents were taken from earlier UN missions in other postconflict
countries such as Bosnia-Herzegovina, East Timor, and Kosovo and did not include
Liberian local content. UN1, CSO4, and G2 argued that UNMIL needed to collaborate
with the Ministry of Justice to develop a training manual for Liberia. It was important
that Liberia develops its own unified code and that the use of local policing principles
and guidelines and local knowledge in handling policing operations was critical and
needed to be captured and taught.
In the findings to Question 2, respondents raised the issue of UNMIL’s training
methodology and the nature and content of the training. The UNMIL used a diversity of
trainers from countries with different political orientations, criminal justice systems, and
policing methods and traditions. A majority of trainers, including those from Africa, had
the British police training orientation, and some trainers had the Russian police training
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orientation originating from the policing traditions of the Soviet era. The challenge that
this broadness of the base of trainers posed was recognized in the “Brahimi Report” of
the United Nations Panel on Peacekeeping Operations (2000):
“The police component of a mission may comprise officers drawn from up to 40
countries who have never met one another before, have little or no United Nations
experience, and have received little relevant training on mission-specific
briefings, and whose policing practices and doctrines may vary widely . . . All of
those factors make it extremely difficult for missions . . . to transform a disparate
group of officers into a cohesive and effective force.” (p.20)
In the case of Liberia, the challenges described in the panel’s report resulted in a training
outcome that lacked a uniform criminal justice orientation with a country-specific local
content. Respondents indicated the view that the diversity of trainers from diverse social
and political backgrounds and contrasting police jurisdictions compromised training
effectiveness and adversely impacted on the effectiveness of job performance of the
UNMIL trained LNP. It also failed to situate the training program within the context of
the country’s history and policing tradition. Liberia is a common law country with a
criminal justice system and a policing tradition specifically patterned after that of the
United States of America. Policing in Liberia is based on that particular context and
history which should have been the basis upon which UNMIL’s police training and
reform interventions was conducted. UNMIL’s failure in this regard affirmed a
significant failure to understand its mission environment. It resulted in the major
challenge of establishing a new police force that is estranged from its history and
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tradition. In Research Question 2, I found that the UNMIL established a police force that
is not harmonized with the policing tradition of Liberia. The LNP today has conflicting
performance orientations, policing values, and even contrasting rank nomenclatures. This
failure presents another critical lesson learned for future UN police training missions. The
conclusion, based on the findings on this issue, is that the practice observed in the
Brahimi Report, by which a multiplicity of trainers is drawn from a variety of policing
jurisdictions based on available donors, should be abolished. Future UN postconflict
international police training and reform programs must not be donor-driven. Instead, the
programs must be driven by what is required to implement reforms specific to enhancing
a host country’s policing needs. That is, trainers must be recruited from countries whose
policing traditions and jurisdictions are the same as that of the host country. The training
program must be implemented to exact the outcome specific to policing in that country.
Recommendation 3
(a) The future UN postconflict international police training programs must not be
donor-driven. The programs must be driven by what is required to implement
reforms specific to enhancing a host country’s policing needs. The mission
must be guided by a standard of a strong partnership, and collaboration to
rehabilitate, integrate and strengthen what is found on the ground and not to
discard it;
(b) Training materials and contents of courses must be developed and reviewed
jointly by the mission and its local counterparts to ensure inclusion of local
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content specific to the context of a country’s history, policing tradition and
jurisdiction; and
(c) As far as practicable, trainers must be recruited from countries whose policing
traditions and jurisdictions are the same or similar to that of the host country.
Recommendation 4
(a) Liberia is a common law country with a criminal justice system and a policing
tradition specifically patterned after that of the United States of America. Policing
in Liberia is based on that particular context and history, which should have been
the basis upon which UNMIL’s police training, was conducted. The UNMIL and
the government of Liberia must embark on a program of retraining, rehabilitation,
and re-orientation to situate the police in its common law criminal justice system
and policing tradition with harmonized organization, structure, and rank
nomenclatures specifically patterned after that of the United States before UNMIL
departs Liberia;
(b) Integral to the new program of retraining and re-orientation should be a
collaborative effort to develop a training manual specific to policing in Liberia.
Liberia should have its own unified code that is based on its criminal justice
jurisdiction, and utilizes local policing principles, guidelines and local knowledge
in handling policing operations; and
(c) This transformation must take place with UNMIL trained officers serving in the
highest ranking strategic positions under the watch of UNMIL for some time
before UNMIL mission ends.
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The Government Perspective
From the perspective of the Government of Liberia, I found several externalities
not directly related to training but which impact on the effectiveness of job performance
of the LNP. I found that correlations and regression used to test the hypotheses showed a
moderately significant correlation between police perceived knowledge and skills gained
during UNMIL training and the job effectiveness perceived by them (r = -0.35).
However, the relationship is an inverse one, implying that as the knowledge gained
increases, the job performance cannot be associated in the same manner or direction. The
implication is that as more resources were are used in training the police, limited
resources were allocated to facilitate their job performance. This formed a basis of
reducing police effectiveness. Moreover, the regression based on the analysis of variance
(ANOVA) showed a significant relationship between knowledge gained and police job
performance. This meant that the police job performance is the result of the training
acquired, thus implying that UNMIL’s police training effected some relative changes
related to the maintenance of law and order. This significant relationship further implied
that police effectiveness would be higher if their capacity regarding questions of
equipment and resources were adequately provided by the government.
These findings provide useful insight into the effectiveness of job performance of
the UNMIL trained police relative to challenges in the context of the government’s
interventions in its police reform program. In the analysis of the survey results,
transcripts from the interviews, documents, and field notes I also found that although the
UNMIL had conducted the theoretical training in relation to police fieldwork, this did not
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necessarily imply that the LNP had the logistics and other resources needed to enable
them perform effectively. Respondents emphasized that the support of the government of
Liberia was complementary to the UNMIL’s training and necessary to ensure
effectiveness of performance. However, the findings showed that the government’s direct
support in this regard had been minimal, and that instead it had relied on international
donor support. To the contrary, respondents emphasized the view that the government
ought not to rely on donor support. They expressed the view that the international
community is committed largely to providing funds for technical training and advisory
support, and much of its funding goes to that area. It is the government of Liberia that has
primary responsibility to provide the actual resources and the funding for the police
institution. The government’s failure to meet this obligation left the UNMIL trained LNP
as one of those institutions that was seriously underfunded and underpaid. A majority of
the respondents emphasized that the public’s lack of confidence in the ability of the
police to maintain law and order is based more on their perception that the government
had not been forthcoming in providing adequate support to capacitate the police to
perform its law enforcement duties. PO1, PO2, CSO6, and G3 argued that the
government of Liberia did not provide the needed support to the police as articulated in
its Poverty Reduction Strategy (2008) and the Agenda for Transformation (2013), and
that its support was necessary to yield performance effectiveness. They argued that when
a police force is trained and deployed to undertake the task of maintaining law and order,
equipment and other needed resources and incentives must be provided as part of the
support that yields performance effectiveness. According to G3, “you must give them the
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tools to work with” because equipment and resources are the complementary aspects of
the training that support effective performance in the field.
On the question of the ability of the police to maintain law and order after
UNMIL leaves Liberia, I found that civil society respondents did not believe that the
LNP was capable to maintain law and order after UNMIL leaves Liberia. Police and civil
society also agreed that police were not able to respond effectively and timely to crimes.
They linked these to the need for additional training and the lack of equipment and
resources. Moreover, other conditions of service that are complementary to training
include salary, benefits, and good working conditions and environment. These are
fundamental factors of effective performance. In postconflict Liberia where poverty is on
the increase, police officers are among the least paid with an average monthly salary of
about one hundred and fifty ($150.00) United States dollars. Out of this salary, they pay
income tax, transport themselves to work, relocate to distant areas of assignment, pay
rent, and care for their families.
In the responses to Question 2, I also found that the UNMIL training had no
impact on police integrity as evidenced by corruption and unfairness in the exercise of
police authority. However, police and civil society respondents linked this lack of
integrity to a culture of unfavorable conditions of work punctuated by factors such as
poor salary and a lack of benefits such as housing, transportation, medical care, and
pension programs for officers. This culture of unfavorable conditions of work was also
linked to low level of attention and handling of the police by the government in all areas
of police work.
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Another issue which emerged as critical to the need for police reform was
political interference in police operations and the need to depoliticize the police.
According to Liebenow (1969), Liberia is a country where “politics is king.” Policing
takes place in a political environment of an entrenched centralized, imperial presidential
system. Political leaders do not place a premium on the mission of the police, and
therefore on its organization and administration even in its postconflict state. To date, the
state continues to regard the police organization more as an instrument for exerting state
control over the citizenry than for the enforcement of laws in the process of postconflict
democratic peace-building and state-building. According to G2 and G3, the state’s
control of the police is exercised primarily by its political appointments of all ranking
officers, and by its control over the finance and expenditure decisions of the police. The
President of Liberia appoints the top brass. The individuals appointed are most often not
from within the organization. Internal promotions also had no set criteria and promotions
are not based on performance, tenure, and merit. All of these factors have historically
demoralized the police rank-and-file, dissuaded motivation, and adversely impacted on
the development of a professional police force.
In Research Question 2, I also found that in the wake of UNMIL’s drawdown, it
was critical for Liberia’s political leaders to appreciate the need to place a high premium
on the mission of the nation’s police force and to act quickly to professionalize it. A
functioning professional LNP will reduce the risk of conflict and make society safer by
providing security for all, including ordinary citizens. It will create the enabling
environment for investment and sustainable economic development, enhance state

143
authority and strengthen Liberia’s nascent democracy. The research also found that this
was the rationale for respondents’ call to depoliticize the police and its operations.
The call to depoliticize the police institution as much as possible emerged as a
major dynamic for professionalizing the LNP. G1, G2, G3, PO1, and PO2 all called for
restructuring the police such that the LNP becomes semi-autonomous with an
independent body exercising oversight responsibility over its operations. For example,
when a vacancy occurs within one of the strategic ranking offices of the police, the
Commission would vet candidates, establish an eligible list of three successful candidates
and submit same to the President from which list one candidate is selected to fill that
vacancy. I advance the following recommendations below based on the findings:
Recommendation 5
5.1 Organization
(a) Enactment of a new law establishing the new Liberia National Police must be
based on recommendations for rehabilitation, reorganization, and reorientation of
the entire LNP, officers, and rank-and-file alike;
(b) Depoliticize and restructure the police organization. By law, establish the LNP as
a semi-autonomous institution as far practicable;
(c) Establish a 5-member Law Enforcement Commission to oversee all aspects of the
operations of the Liberia National Police;
(d) Appointment of senior ranking officers of the LNP must be based on merit. Once
appointed by the President, senior ranking officers must have tenure to serve for a
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definite period; they should be removed only by process of impeachment through
the Legislature;
(e) Line level officers must be promoted based on merit; consider education,
experience, tenure and meritorious performance; salary increments and
promotions must be based on results of performance evaluation.
5.2 Remuneration
(f) Establish a pay and grade system based on position classification that begins with
police entry-level pay and benefits graduated over time periods; consult the Civil
Service Agency on the position classification and pay starting with line level
oficers; and
(g) Abolish the income tax for line level officers earning monthly gross income
below USD$200.00.
5.3 Housing
(h) New LNP law to be enacted must have a provision requiring construction of
barracks for police officers throughout the country. Police barracks of
conventional standard (i.e., West Africa sub-region) must be constructed in all
county capitals throughout the country; and in populated cities and emerging
urban areas around the country;
(i) Housing allowance scheme should be put in place for line level officers assigned
to areas not having barracks.
5.4 Service benefits
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(j) Education: Provide free education to children and dependents of line level police
officers up to completion of the 12th grade. Free education defined to include free
registration fees and books;
(k) Medical: Free medical care in government clinics and hospitals for officers, their
children and dependents. Free medical care defined to include free registration
and free laboratory tests; and
(l)

Insurance: Establish a program to provide free life insurance coverage for line
level or rank-and file police offiers.

Implications for Social Change
UN Police Reform Missions
Future UN police training missions must be guided by the general standard of a
strong partnership, effective coordination and collaboration between the mission, and the
local security sector regime to jointly provide program direction and support.
Additionally, the practice observed in the Brahimi Report, by which a multiplicity of
trainers is drawn from a variety of policing jurisdictions should be abolished. Future UN
postconflict international police training missions should be driven by what is required to
implement training specific to a host country’s policing needs and not by donors.
The Liberia National Police
The government of Liberia must take ownership of the UNMIL training program
to provide much needed leadership and direction. It must recommit to the police training
program and place a high premium on the mission of the nation’s police force. The

146
government and UNMIL must jointly respond to the need to rehabilitate, retrain, and reorientate the police and to situate it in its original uniform common law criminal justice
system and policing jurisdiction, which is specifically patterned after that of the United
States of America. Another major dynamic of the findings of the research was the clarion
call for the Government to act quickly to professionalize the Liberia National Police and
to depoliticize its operations. Respondents emphasized the need to implement a meritbased system for officers and the rank-and-file, and to restructure the police organization
as a semi-autonomous institution as far as is practicable before the UNMIL’s departure
from Liberia. The social change implications of all this is that an effective functioning
professional LNP will reduce the risk of return to conflict. It will make society safer by
providing security for all including ordinary citizens. It will create the enabling
environment for investment and sustainable economic growth, development, and social
stability and enhance state authority while strengthening Liberia’s nascent democracy.
Recommendations for Future Research
The LNP operates as a part of the larger criminal justice system of Liberia.
According to G2, the three tiers of Liberia’s criminal justice system include the police,
prosecution, and corrections. Police work involves pretrial detentions, evidence
gathering, and production of admissible evidence to protect the rights of parties in the
courts. According to the US State Department’s Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices (2013), Liberia’s courts are laden with judicial inefficiencies. Liberia’s jurors,
judges, and magistrates are subject of influence and corruption. There is also the issue of
uneven distribution of human resource personnel, equipment, and resources throughout
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the judicial system. All of these undermine effective police performance. The
effectiveness of job performance of the police is somewhat tied to the effectiveness of the
entire criminal justice system. However, there is no current related judicial reform
program in place that could be aligned with the ongoing UNMIL police training and
reform interventions. Additional research is needed to determine how police reform can
be implemented as part of a larger program of a holistic criminal justice reform in order
to enhance the effectiveness of performance of the police in the future.
Chapter Summary
This study examined how UNMIL police training affected effectiveness and
public confidence in the ability of the LNP to maintain law and order. A mixed methods
approach was used. Likert scales were used to collect quantitative data. Qualitative data
consisted of documentary sources and individual, semi-structured interviews with openended and closed questions. Participants were officials of government, UNMIL, officers
of LNP, and leaders and members of civil society organizations.
The UNMIL’s police training yielded mixed results. To the extent that local
context of policing varies from one country to another, the design and implementation of
any international police reform assistance program should be based on context-specific
knowledge and expertise. In the case of Liberia, UNMIL was not well-informed about its
mission environment. This resulted in the repetition of errors made by earlier police
reform missions in countries such as Bosnia-Herzegovina and East Timor. In Liberia, the
diversity of trainers from contrasting policing jurisdictions of different nations yielded a
program outcome that lacked a country-specific context of history and policing tradition.

148
Liberia is a common law country with a criminal justice system and policing tradition
patterned after that of the United States. Liberia’s history and policing context should
have been the basis upon which the UNMIL training was conducted in order to establish
a country-specific professional police force that gains local ownership. Instead, the
UNMIL established a police force that is not harmonized with its policing tradition and
has conflicting performance orientations, policing values, and even contrasting rank
nomenclatures.
I also found that the government of Liberia failed to take ownership of the
training program and to provide much needed leadership and direction due to its weak
commitment and inadequate resource support to complement the training. Respondents
emphasized the view that had the government been committed to taking ownership of the
training program, it would have been able to insist on country-specific training,
orientation, and program outcomes. Another issue which emerged as critical to the reform
was that policing in Liberia takes place in a political environment of an entrenched
centralized, imperial presidential system in which political leaders do not place a
premium on the mission of the police, and therefore on its organization and
administration even in its postconflict state. The administration and operation of the
police remained highly politicized.
The future implications of these results are that the UNMIL and the government
of Liberia need to heighten collaboration to implement a comprehensive program of
retraining, rehabilitation, and reorientation to professionalize and situate the LNP in its
original uniform common law criminal justice system and policing tradition. Liberia’s

149
political leaders should depoliticize the police, grant semi-autonomous status to it, and
provide adequate resource support. All of the transformation cited above must take place
with UNMIL trained officers serving in the highest ranking strategic positions under the
watch of UNMIL for some time before the end of its mission in Liberia. For the UN,
police training missions should be driven by what is required to implement training
specific to a host country’s policing needs and not by donors.
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AppendixA: List of Acronyms
AFL

Armed Forces of Liberia

BIN

Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization

CPA

Comprehensive Peace Agreement

ECOWAS

Economic Community of West African States

ECOMOG

ECOWAS Military Monitoring Group

UNMIL

United Nations Mission in Liberia

UNOMIL

United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia

LINEA

Liberia Law Enforcement Association

LNP

Liberia National Police

LFF

Liberia Frontier Force

PRS

Poverty Reduction Strategy

163

Appendix B; Participants’ Recruitment Letters
WALDEN UNIVERSITY
The United Nations Training of the Liberia National Police:
Effectiveness, Results and Future Implications
RECRUITMENT LETTER (Survey)
To Whom It May Concern:
You are invited to participate in my dissertation research survey of the police training
provided by the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) to the Liberia National
Police (LNP). My name is Yarsuo Weh-Dorliae. I am the researcher conducting the
survey as a partial fulfillment of the requirements for my PhD degree in Public Policy.
The purpose of the survey is to gain better understanding of how police training by
UNMIL has affected the capacity of the Liberia National Police to effectively maintain
law and order. For this survey, I am seeking the following participants:
Members of community-based civil society organizations who have experienced the
performance of the LNP in their local communities; and
Police field officers who have been trained by UNMIL;
Participation in this survey is strictly voluntary. All information you will provide will
also be strictly confidential. No names will be associated with the information you
provide. You will be allowed to indicate where and when you choose to have the survey
conducted.
Please contact me by phone 231-886-951-263 or email yarsuo.weh-dorliae@waldenu.edu
to arrange a date and time for the survey. Thank you for considering to participate in this
survey.
Sincerely,
Signed
Yarsuo Weh-Dorliae

164

WALDEN UNIVERSITY
The United Nations Training of the Liberia National Police:
Effectiveness, Results and Future Implications
RECRUITMENT LETTER (Interview)
To Whom It May Concern:
You are invited to participate in my dissertation research interview in my study of the
police training provided by the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) to the
Liberia National Police (LNP). My name is Yarsuo Weh-Dorliae. I am the researcher
conducting this study as a partial fulfillment of the requirements for my PhD degree in
Public Policy. The purpose of the interview is to gain better understanding of how police
training by UNMIL has affected the capacity of the Liberia National Police to effectively
maintain law and order. For this interview, I am seeking the following participants:
Leaders of community-based civil society organizations who have experienced
the performance of the LNP in their local communities;
Police supervisors and ranking officers who have been trained by UNMIL;
Ranking officers and officials of UNMIL; and
Officials of the Government of Liberia who participated in training decisions.
Participation in this study is strictly voluntary. All information you will provide will also
be strictly confidential. Interviews will be audio recorded. No names will be associated
with the information you provide. You will be allowed to indicate where and when you
choose to have the interview.
Please contact me by phone 231-886-951-263 or email yarsuo.weh-dorliae@waldenu.edu
to arrange a date and time for the interview. Thank you for considering to participate in
this study.
Sincerely,
Signed
Yarsuo Weh-Dorliae
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Appendix C: Informed Consent Forms
WALDEN UNIVERSITY
PARTICIPANT’S CONSENT FORM (Interview)
The United Nations Training of the Liberia National Police:
Effectiveness, Results and Future Implications
You are invited to take part in a research study of the police training provided by the
United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) to the Liberia National Police (LNP). The
researcher is inviting police officers who have been trained by UNMIL, ranking UNMIL
officers and officials of the Government of Liberia who participated in training decisions,
and members of community-based civil society organizations who have experienced the
performance of the LNP in their local communities to be in the study. This study is being
conducted by a student named Yarsuo Weh-Dorliae (Researcher), as a partial fulfillment
of the requirements for his PhD degree in Public Policy at the Walden University. The
purpose of the study is to get a better understanding of how police training by UNMIL
has affected the capacity of the Liberia National Police to effectively maintain law and
order and gain public confidence.
Procedures:
If you agree to take part in this study, you will be asked to respond to answer interview
questions presented by the researcher. Consent form must be signed by you in order for
the interview to be conducted. You will be asked to:
• Respond verbally to thirteen (13) interview questions. The interview will be audio
recorded. Some examples of the questions are: “Do you believe that the Liberia
National Police today are likely to protect the government more than the
citizens?” and “Do you trust the Liberia National Police today to bear arms in
order to do effective police work?
• The interview will take about one hour to complete. Following the interview, I will
request that you meet with me later to go over my interpretation and initial impressions of
what you said in your responses.

Voluntary Nature of the Study:
Participation in this study is strictly voluntary. The researcher will respect your decision
whether or not you choose to be in the study. If you initially decide to participate, you are
still free to change your mind later and withdraw at any time.
Risks and Benefits of Being in the Study:
Your participation in this study will pose minimal risk. However, in the event you
experience stress, you may terminate your participation at any time. You may refuse to
answer any questions you consider invasive or stressful. A referral list of no-to low-cost
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mental health providers is attached to this Consent Form for easy reference. The researcher will

exhibit sensitivity to guard against a situation of the interview becoming emotionally
charged. Your privacy will be respected. You will be allowed to indicate where and when
you choose to have the interview.
In terms of benefits, if you choose to participate in this study, you will have an
opportunity
to express your views and make a major contribution to knowledge about the capacity of
the Liberia National Police to effectively maintain law and order and gain citizens’
confidence. Your views will also help the United Nations in planning police reform
programs for future postconflict countries.
Compensation:
There will be no compensation provided for your participation in this study.
Confidentiality:
The records of this study will be kept private. In any report of this study that might be
published, the researcher will not include any information that will make it possible to
identify you. All data are strictly confidential and no names will be associated with the
data in any way. Any information you provide will be kept confidential. The data will be
used for the research purposes only. The data will be kept secured electronically with a
password known only to the researcher. The data will also be kept for a period of at least
five years as required by the University.
Contacts and Questions:
The researcher conducting this study is Yarsuo Weh-Dorliae. Yarsuo Weh-Dorliae is also
a Commissioner of the Governance Commission. However, the researcher’s role as a
commissioner is not in any way connected to this study.
The researcher’s faculty advisor is Dr. Donald McLellan. You may ask any questions you
have now. If you have questions later, you may contact Yarsuo Weh-Dorliae at 231-886951-263 or email yarsuo.wehdorliae@waldenu.edu. If you want to talk privately about
your rights as a participant, you can call Dr. Leilani Endicott. She is the Walden
University representative who can discuss this with you. Her phone number is 001-612312-1210. Walden University’s approval number for this study is 07-30-13-0065268, and
it expires on July 29, 2014. You will receive a copy of this form from the researcher.
STATEMENT OF CONSENT:
I have read the above information and I feel I understand the study well enough to make a
decision about my involvement. By signing below, I understand that I am agreeing to the
terms described above.
Name of Participant: _______________________________
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Date of Consent: ____________________________________
Participant’s Signature: _______________________________
Researcher’s Signature: __________________________

WALDEN UNIVERSITY
PARTICIPANT’S CONSENT FORM (Survey)
The United Nations Training of the Liberia National Police:
Effectiveness, Results and Future Implications
You are invited to take part in a research study of the police training provided by the
United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) to the Liberia National Police (LNP). The
researcher is inviting police officers who have been trained by UNMIL, ranking UNMIL
officers and officials of the Government of Liberia who participated in training decisions,
and members of community-based civil society organizations who have experienced the
performance of the LNP in their local communities to be in the study. This study is being
conducted by a student named Yarsuo Weh-Dorliae (Researcher), as a partial fulfillment
of the requirements for his PhD degree in Public Policy at the Walden University. The
purpose of the study is to get a better understanding of how police training by UNMIL
has affected the capacity of the Liberia National Police to effectively maintain law and
order and gain public confidence.
Procedures:
If you agree to take part in this study, you will be asked to respond to survey questions
presented by the researcher. You will be asked to respond to forty-one (41) survey
questions that will take about 30 minutes to complete. Some examples of the survey
questions are: “Do you believe that the Liberia National Police today are likely to protect
the government more than the citizens?” and “Do you trust the Liberia National Police
today to bear arms in order to do effective police work?
Voluntary Nature of the Study:
Participation in this study is strictly voluntary. The researcher will respect your decision
whether or not you choose to be in the study. If you initially decide to participate, you are
still free to change your mind later and withdraw at any time.
Risks and Benefits of Being in the Study:
Your participation in this study will pose minimal risk. However, in the event you
experience stress, you may terminate your participation at any time. You may refuse to
answer any questions you consider invasive or stressful. A referral list of no-to low-cost
mental health providers is attached to this Consent Form for easy reference. The researcher will
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exhibit sensitivity to guard against a situation of the interview becoming emotionally
charged. Your privacy will be respected. You will be allowed to indicate where and when
you choose to have the interview.
In terms of benefits, if you choose to participate in this study, you will have an
opportunity
to express your views and make a major contribution to knowledge about the capacity of
the Liberia National Police to effectively maintain law and order and gain citizens’
confidence. Your views will also help the United Nations in planning police reform
programs for future postconflict countries.
Compensation:
There will be no compensation provided for your participation in this study.
Confidentiality:
The records of this study will be kept private. In any report of this study that might be
published, the researcher will not include any information that will make it possible to
identify you. All data are strictly confidential and no names will be associated with the
data in any way. Any information you provide will be kept confidential. The data will be
used for the research purposes only. The data will be kept secured electronically with a
password known only to the researcher. The data will also be kept for a period of at least
five years as required by the University.
Contacts and Questions:
The researcher conducting this study is Yarsuo Weh-Dorliae. Yarsuo Weh-Dorliae is also
a Commissioner of the Governance Commission. However, the researcher’s role as a
commissioner is not in any way connected to this study.
The researcher’s faculty advisor is Dr. Donald McLellan. You may ask any questions you
have now. If you have questions later, you may contact Yarsuo Weh-Dorliae at 231-886951-263 or email yarsuo.wehdorliae@waldenu.edu. If you want to talk privately about
your rights as a participant, you can call Dr. Leilani Endicott. She is the Walden
University representative who can discuss this with you. Her phone number is 001-612312-1210. Walden University’s approval number for this study is _________________,
and it expires on _______________. You may keep this consent form.
STATEMENT OF CONSENT:
In order to protect your privacy, your signature will not be collected. Your completion of
the survey will indicate your consent, if you choose to participate.

169

Appendix D; Interview Protocol
WALDEN UNIVERSITY
The United Nations Training of the Liberia National Police:
Effectiveness, Results and Future Implications
Interview Protocol:
Thank you for taking the time to meet with me today. My name is Yarsuo Weh-Dorliae. I
am conducting this study as a partial fulfillment of the requirements for my PhD degree
in Public Policy at the Walden University. The purpose of the study is to gain deeper
understanding of how police training by UNMIL have affected the capacity of the Liberia
National Police to effectively maintain law and order and gain public confidence.
This interview will take no more than one hour. The interview be audio taped so I can
properly transcribe all interviews. Also, I will be taking some notes during the session.
Because we are on tape, please speak clearly so that your comments are heard. All
responses will be kept confidential. This means that your interview responses will not be
shared with anyone else. I will also ensure that any information you provide for this study
does not identify you in any way as the respondent. Remember, you do not have to talk
about anything you don’t want to and you may end the interview at any time. Do you
have any questions about what I have just explained?
Are you willing to participate in this interview?
Questions:
1. Do you believe that if a citizen knew a police recruit who had committed human
rights abuses he or she will not complain to UNMIL for fear of revenge?
2. Do you believe that the Liberia National Police today are likely to protect the
government more than the citizens?
3. Do you believe that the Liberia National Police Officers treat all citizens fairly
and impartially when they investigate their cases?
4. How has UNMIL training impacted on the integrity of the police on the issue of
corruption?
5. How has UNMIL training impacted on the effectiveness of the police to collect
evidence and present accurate records of criminal investigations to protect the
rights of parties in the courts?
6. Do the UNMIL trained ranking officers or leaders of the Liberia National Police
have the knowledge to provide professional leadership to their subordinates?
7. If you saw a crime being committed in your community, who would you prefer to
call first for help, your neighbor OR the Liberia National Police?
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8. Do you believe that UNMIL training was coordinated and subjects covered
followed country-specific guidelines?
9. Do you believe that some members of the UNMIL trained Liberia National Police
were involved in some of the crimes committed around the country?
10. What do you believe are some of the current challenges facing the Liberia
National Police?
11. The mission of UNMIL in Liberia will end on September 30, 2015. Do you
believe that the Liberia National Police is capable to maintain law and order after
UNMIL leaves Liberia?
12. What recommendations do you have to improve the effectiveness of the Liberia
National police and gain public confidence?
13. Is there anything more you would like to add?
I will be analyzing the information you and others have given me and I will be contacting
you to review the transcription in order to ensure accuracy of information and increase
the validity of the research findings. Thus, you will have the opportunity to review
transcripts and be offered the opportunity to discuss the transcribed copy of your
interview.
Thank you for your time.
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Appendix E: Letters of Cooperation from Community Partners
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Curriculum Vitae
Yarsuo Weh-Dorliae

Monrovia, Liberia

PROFILE
Yarsuo Weh-Dorliae is a career civil servant. He is a public sector human resources
management professional with more than twenty-five years of proven managerial experience in
providing executive leadership, planning, program development, project coordination,
compensation, and staff development. He is a highly analytical generalist who possesses a wide
range of skills in public sector reform and socio-economic development administration. He
consistently initiates action and accepts responsibility in exercising professional judgment with
integrity; maintains outstanding relationship with people and is committed to furthering the
success of team members. As author and newspaper columnist, Weh-Dorliae has written
extensively on public service reform, decentralization and democratic governance in Liberia.
PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE
GOVERNANCE COMMISSION, GOVERNMENT OF LIBERIA
Commissioner, Political & Legal Reforms/Decentralization, November, 2007 –
Present:
Responsible at full performance level, for performing a variety of rotational assignments thinking
and developing concepts and ideas to strengthen policy development in political and legal reform
programs; provide policy guidance in the implementation of a system of decentralized
participatory governance in Liberia; collaborate with ministries and agencies of the Government,
United Nations organizations, local and international non-governmental organizations, civil
society and the citizenry at large and lead public policy development under the Commission’s
Political and Legal Reforms mandate area.

PERSONNEL DEPARTMENT, CITY OF PHILADELPHIA
Personnel Analyst, Hiring Services Division, November 9, 1998 – March, 2007:
Responsible, at full performance level, for performing public personnel work proficiently in all
areas including job design, assessment and compensation; managing projects involving
development and implementation of hiring process procedures, policies and regulations;
collaborating with City administrators, union officials, employees and the public to facilitate
resolution of hiring issues; Interpreting and applying civil service regulations, laws, policies,
standards, and procedures; mentoring and training others including new employees.

CIVIL SERVICE AGENCY, GOVERNMENT OF LIBERIA
Senior Staff Analyst, Selections Division January 1980 – August 1981
Developed and supervised administration of written examinations. Responsible for test
development and security of all examination materials; Conducted job analysis and position
classification surveys along with colleagues, and coordinating the Agency’s public relations
activities and participating in interagency projects, seminars, and conferences.
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CIVIL SERVICE AGENCY, GOVERNMENT OF LIBERIA
Research Associate, Selections Division January 1977 – January 1978
Performed rotational assignments in human resources research support work; provided
general administrative support in all aspects of human resource development work;
assisted analysts in conducting job analysis and position classification surveys; work with
analysts to ensure employment procedures are followed, and perform rotational
personnel development work assignments.
UNIVERSITY OF LIBERIA, GOVERNMENT OF LIBERIA
Lecturer, (part time) College of Business and Public Administration, 1981 – 1985/1992
– 1995:
Taught junior and senior levels courses in Public Personnel Administration,
Public Enterprise Organization and Management, Government Planning and
Rural Development.

TIALA LAW ASSOCIATES, INC. MONROVIA, LIBERIA
Attorney-At-Law, 1995 -1996
Achievements:
Served as legal counsel and provided advisory services to party litigants; evaluated clients’
complaints, reviewed case related documents and records and conducted research to determine
applicable laws. Prepared briefs, responses to motions and represented clients at trials and
hearings; conducted legal research and discovery work in association with pending cases;
interacted with court personnel and officials in association with clients’ cases.

MINISTRY OF TRANSPORT, GOVRNMENT OF LIBERIA
Deputy Minister for Administration, 1991 – 1995
Provided executive leadership in implementation of the national laws, regulations and policies
governing the transportation sector; direct the provision of administrative services through
supervision of line functions for effective operations in the provision of services to the public;
determined, analyzed, and resolved administrative problems in ensuring that functions meet the
needs of the public; established effective working relationships with employees and associates;
collaborated with officials of other ministries and agencies, and representatives of nongovernmental and international organizations in pursuing specific and general the general
objectives of the Ministry.

FIVE STAR PARKING, INC., PHILADELPHIA, PA (USA)
Field Manager, 1988 – 1991
Supervised operations of assigned parking garages and lots; participated in decisions
relating to policy changes governing the operations and maintenance of facilities;
collected revenues generated (in daily excess of $5,000.00) from cashiers and lot
attendants; prepared daily and monthly financial reports; recruited and trained cashiers
and parking lot attendants; maintained effective customer relations with clients and the
general public
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UNITED STATES MILITARY MISSION/LIBERIA
Logistics Administrator, 1985 – 1986
Performed inventory and procurement operations administration work; worked with staff
to resolve problems and monitored provision of services, equipment and supplies in
accordance with established guidelines; interacted with local vendors, contractors and
government officials in coordinating services on behalf of the Mission.

PARKER INDUSTRIES, INC. GOVERNMENT OF LIBERIA
Managing Director, 1981 – 1983
Responsible to direct provision of administrative services necessary for managing the
operations of the corporation such as management of personnel, maintenance of facility,
budget preparation, and procurement of raw materials for production; responsible to
analyze and ascertain the financial status of the corporation, set overall goals and
priorities, and direct implementation of solutions to problems and issues; direct fiscal
management and technical operations of corporation through subordinate managers and
supervisors.
EDUCATION
Bachelor of Laws, Louise Arthur Grimes School of Law, University of Liberia
1985
Master of Public Administration, California State University, Sacramento

December
January 1980

Master of Arts, (International Affairs) California State University, Sacramento
1980
Bachelor of Arts, (Economics) University of Liberia

May
December 1976
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Weh-Dorliae, Y. (2009). Liberia, we are alike, we are one! My reading
Lesson for Peace. Philadelphia: Bushfire Ventures.
Weh-Dorliae, Y. (2004). Proposition 12 for Decentralized Governance in Liberia: Power
Sharing for Peace and Progress. Philadelphia: Bushfire Ventures
MEMBERSHIP
International Personnel Management Association (IPMA), 1998
Liberian Bar Association,

1992
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